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PREFACE

The stream of political and social thought of a small number of

Arab thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
which
led to the genesis of Arabism is an important but neglected subject of

study*

This essay attempts an interpretive synthesis of the information

and ideas on that topic contained in various distinguished works.

The

ideas of this Arab literate elite in urging a revival of social values

and institutions were formulated primarily in reaction to the impact of
the West.

The Arabs under consideration were predominantly Syrian and

Lebanese, who provided the most active intellectual and political ferment
in behalf of Arabism.

Egypt is not part of our discussion since it did

not partake of the Arab movement during the period covered by this essay.
The main emphasis is on the inseparability of Arabism from Islam
and on the successive phases of Arab reaction to Ottoman rule.

Brief

chapters on Ottoman revival and the Young Turk Revolution are included
to provide the necessary background information for a full understanding

of the transformation of Arab attitudes toward the Ottoman Empire, which

shifted from loyalty to discontent to alienation.
I

would like to express my deep gratitude to my mentor, Professor

George E. Kirk, who read the essay in draft form and made many helpful

suggestions which are incorporated.

Dominic Saadi

May 1970
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I

BACKGROUND: OTTOMAN EFFORTS TO REFORM

The traditional self-view^ of the Ottoman Empire assumed the superi-

ority of that civilization to all others.

This feeling of self-assurance

was an illusion from which the Ottoman Empire was slowly shaken by a

series of humiliating defeats in the eighteenth century to the unbelieving
West.

2

The military system and the civil administration of the Empire

were geared to the needs of a society organized for conquest and expansion.

This state structure, which in a sense was a military machine, failed to

adjust to the different demands of

a

society whose frontier was eroding.

3

The Empire's inability to cope with the internal stresses and dislocation

resulting from a contracting frontier manifested the utter exhaustion of
its old patterns of government.

By the nineteenth century certain members of the Ottoman governing
circles recognized the urgency for change; an urgency that originally

resulted from the global problems of military defeat.

They decided that,

encroachin order to defend the Empire against European, chiefly Russian,

must
ments, and to restore central control over the provinces, measures

^This term is used by G. E. von Grunebaum,
for Cultural Identity (New York, 1962), passim.

Modem

Isl am: The Search

East Journa_l_,
Moder n Turkey (London,
XIX (1965), 435; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of
1968), 34-35.
^C. Ernest Dawn, "Arab Islam in the

\ewis. Modem Turkey

,

27; L.

S.

Modem Age," Middle

Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453

(New York, 1958), 135-36.
-1-

be taken to revitalize the Empire's system of government and to modernize
certain of its institutions.

4

To preserve the Empire's integrity, and to meet the needs of the
time, the Ottoman reformers of the nineteenth century promulgated a long

series of laws and regulations, known collectively as the Tanzimat (Re-

organization).

The most outstanding Tanzimat reforms were the Hatt-i

Sherif of Gulhane (the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber), promulgated
in 1839, the Hatt-i Huroayun (the Imperial Rescript), promulgated in 1856,
and the Constitution of 1876.^

The Hatt-i Sherif , besides proposing reform in the administration
of the provinces, proclaimed principles such as:

honor and property; the abolition of tax abuses;

the security of life,
a fair

system of military

recruitment; fair and public trials of persons accused of crimes; and

equality of persons of all religions before the

lav;.

The Hatt-i Humayun

reaffirmed the principles of the edict of 1839, and it established, in
specific and categorical terms, the full equality of non-Muslims.

In

addition, it promised popular representation in the provincial councils,
as well as other legal and administrative reforms.

The Constitution of

1876, the first in Ottoman history, provided a parliament to share certain

legislative functions of the Sultan.
All three major reform documents often have been denounced by

Western critics as deceptive instruments of diplomacy, intended to

^Dawn, "Arab Islam," 435- 3d
the texts of the Hatt-i Sherif and the Hatt-i Hu mayun , see
East: A Documentarx
J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomac y in th e Near and Middle
for a disRecord (Princeton, New Jersey, 1956), I, 113-16 and 149-53;
cussion, see Roderick H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman EmE ire^l856::^^^
115-16
(Princeton, 1963), 40-41 and 52-57; Lewis, Modeini Turkey, 106-108,

\or

and 164-66.

3.

forestall Western intervention by erecting a facade of
domestic reform.
This criticism, in part, is valid, since each of the
prominent reform

edicts was produced at a time of international crisis, when
the Ottoman

Government was in need of conciliating Europe.

The Hatt~i Sherif of 1839

was proclaimed when European support was needed to check Muhammad Ali,
the rebellious Pasha of Egypt.

The Hatt-i Humayun came immediately at

the end of the Crimean War, when Britain and France had allied themselves

with the Ottoman Empire against Russia.

The Ottoman Constitution was

promulgated at the time of the Balkan crisis, when European intervention
seemed imminent.^
To assert, however, that the sole objective of the reform procla-

mations was to appease Europe, is to miss the essential intention of the
Tanzimat.

While the reform decrees were precipitated and crystallized

as a result of European pressure, they already had been considered by

the Tanzimat statesmen, who were convinced of the necessity of modern-

ization to preserve the Empire.^

The ultimate purpose of the Ottoman

reform programs, notwithstanding their liberal phraseology and Western
influence, was to restore the integrity of the Empire by strengthening
the powers of the central government and by reintegrating the provinces.

Promises of equality and administrative reorganization had different
implications for Ottoman statesmen and non-lluslin subjects: while for the

latter they meant greater rights and opportunities, for the former they

Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. 1516-1922 (New York,
1966), 171; Lewis, Modern Turkey 165-66.

Seter

,

^Roderick H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim
Equality in the Nineteenth Century," Ame rican Historical Re vie_w, LIX, 4
(1953-54), 850-51; Lewis, Modem Turkey 166.
,

s

4.

meant revival of imperial strength through the
consolidation of the
Empire's disparate social forces.^

mulgated from above.

All of the reform edicts were pro-

Even the Constitution of 1876, like the Prussian

constitutional edict of 1850 on which it was based, did not
originate
from a constituent assembly.

In a sense, it was an authoritarian document,

enumerating the Sultan's powers and guaranteeing the government wide

jurisdiction in proclaiming martial

lav7.

The trend toward autocratic reformism was substantially reinforced

by Abdul Hamid (1876-1908), under whom the whole Tanzimat movement
reached its culmination.

him by the Tanzimat

'

The path toward autocratic rule was paved for

elimination of many of the traditional legal and

social checks that formerly had circumscribed the Sultan's power.

Abdul

Haraid extended

the scope of the main Tanzimat programs; modernization of

the systems of

lav;,

civil administration and education; centralization of

authority, implemented with the help of Western techniques such as the

telegraph and the railroad.

10

The Ottoman program of centralization, however, was unable to stay
the erosion of the Empire's boundaries.

By the last quarter of the nine-

teenth century, all the Balkan provinces, with the exception of Albania,

were either autonomous, or independent, or else occupied by Western Powers.

^Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 1798-1939
(London, 1962), 95.
g

Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent , 172; Lewis, Modern Turkey , 164.

^%olt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent

,

172; Hourani, Arabic Thought

,

^^For a detailed account of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78 and of the
Treaty of Berlin of 1879, see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Questio n. 17741923 (New York, 1966), 178-219; Stavrianos, Tlie Balkans 393-413.
,

2

Further contraction of the Empire's periphery occurred when Tunisia was
occupied in 1881 by France, and Egypt in 1882 by Britain.

Many of the Tanzimat reforras had been designed with the objective
of forestalling rebellion and keeping the provinces within the Empire*
This was the purpose of programs such as:

administrative reform in the

provinces; equality of all subjects regardless of religion; and unification
of all subjects on an equal basis with universal loyalty to the Ottoman

Empire.

These projects, however, were unable to counteract the centrifu-

gal force of Balkan nationalism, which was fomented by the diplomatic

maneuverings of the European Powers and by the influence of their political
ideologies.

1

Serbia and Bulgaria bluntly rejected a scheme proposed

by the Grand Vezir Midhat Pasha in 1872 of converting the Ottoman Empire
into a federal state along the lines of Bismarck's Germany.

13

Promises

of corporate equality and universal Ottoman nationality, hov;ever, had

little appeal to the Balkan Christians who desired nothing less than

complete separation from the Ottoman Empire.

Another main factor that militated against the integration of the
various subject nationalities was the intransigence of the Empire's Muslim
population.

Arabic speaking Muslims, no less than their Turkish speaking

coreligionists, opposed the program of equality for both religious and
a fundasocial reasons: some viewed it as an unforgiveable violation of

non-Muslims;
mental Islamic doctrine prescribing an inferior status to

moneychangers
and others, such as administrative officials, tax-farmers,
on their economic
and the like, felt that it would lead to an encroachment

^^Stavrianos,
^-^Davison,

Tl\e

Balkans, 222, 338.

"Turkish Attitudes," 853.

6.

and political vested interests.

14

Muslim Arabs, in contrast to the Christian peoples of the Balkans,
considered the Ottoman Islamic Empire their cultural home.

The Empire

was, after all, a Muslim state; and moreover, as the most powerful of
the existing Muslim states, it was the protector of Sunni Islam.

The

loyalty of Muslim Arabs to Islam, and thus to the Ottoman Empire,
transcended any other feeling of allegiance.

They remained uninfected

by the virus of nationalism until the early part of the twentieth century.
Nevertheless, they responded to the stimulus of the Tanzimat

,

in which

they found the opportunity of reviving Muslim strength and ensuring

Muslim ascendancy in the Empire.
^^

Ibid

.,

861 n. 46.

II

DIVERGENCE OF MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN ARAB OUTLOOKS

The Ottoman Empire, after losses of territory in the Balkans and
in North Africa, became predominantly an Asian state, in which the Arabs

of the Fertile Crescent constituted a large proportion of the population^

According to some estimates, the inhabitants of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon
and Palestine numbered about three and a half million at mid-nineteenth

century, and more than five and a half million at the beginning of the

First

Woj3d

War.

2

Muslims, mostly Sunnis, comprised the vast majority of

the total.

The various reform movements in the Arab provinces of the Empire

during the last quarter of the nineteenth century arose in response to
the Tanzimat reforms and to European influence.

But to understand the

nature and the objectives of these movements, we must first establish
a distinction of fundamental

importance, namely, the difference between

Muslim Arab and Christian Arab outlooks vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire and
the West.

The divergent character of Muslim and Christian Arab political

and social aspirations originated in their fundamentally different

attitudes toward the Ottoman Empire.
A Muslim community (umma )

,

joined by a common system of religious

^Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent

,

173.

^Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1966),
Appendices A and B.

8.

priiiciples and values, existed within the vast, culturally heterogeneous

Ottoman Empire.

It was the single most pervasive element of unity within

the Empire.
To most Muslim Arabs the Ottoman Empire was more than a political

structure; it was the heir of Islamic civilization, the successor of the

great Islamic empires.

Indeed, it was primarily a Sunni Muslim state,

based essentially on those most sublime principles of Islam embodied in
the Shari'a

3

(the Sacred Law of Islam).

The overriding importance of the Islamic character of the Ottoman

Empire to the Muslim essentially derived from the fact that the dominant
feature of his individuality was his status as a believer.

4

His first

loyalty was to Islam, and, as a corollary, to the Ottoman Empire which
was its political embodiment, and to the Sultan who ruled over it.^
Sunni Muslims regarded the Ottoman sultanate as the lineal sucThe theoretical justification for

cessor of the medieval caliphate.

the legitimization of a secular authority over Islam had been formulated

by the jurist al-Mawardi as early as the eleventh century, when he
established the doctrine that

a

secular ruler, having established effective

power, is to be obeyed in the public interest, as long as he upholds the

principles of the Shari'a

,

protects Islam, and respects the rights and

authority of the Muslim religious institution.^

Accordingly, the Ottoman

Sunna-^The Shari'a comprises the Qur' an--divine revelation, and the
utterances and practices of the Prophet Muhammad.

^Von Grunebaum, Modern Islam

,

181.

(London,
^Ibid., 283; Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West
1964), 72.

^Hamilton A.
1962), 160.

R.

(Boston,
Gibb, .^fudips on the Civilization of Islam

Sultan, as the strongest and most competent defender of Sunni Islam,

was esteemed by the Muslim faithful as the supreme head of the Ottoman
Islamic Empire.^

Muslim Arab recognition of the Sultan as head of Islam implied
acknowledgment of his authority in all aspects of individual and social
life.

Islam, like classical Judaism, claimed the complete allegiance

of the faithful, uniting "religion" and "politics".

It was more than a

religion in the current interpretation of the word.

It was a cultural

unit, based on a comprehensive system of law and values.

8

Muslim Arabs, besides formally adhering to the Empire on religious
or philosophical grounds, were bound to it for material reasons.

They

benefited from the extension of state-operated educational institutions,
railroads and other government-sponsored projects of modernization.
Moreover, their political and social dominance was ensured by the existing

governmental structure.

They constituted the largest number of local

administrative and judicial officials in the Arabic-speaking provinces,
9

and some of them were among the closest advisers of the Sultan.

Another factor that bound Muslim Arabs to the Ottoman Empire was
their special position in Islam, which, to some extent, was officially
recognized.

It was based on facts such as, the Qur'an is in Arabic,

the Prophet was an Arab, and the original Muslims were Arabs.

Arabic

maintained its privileged function as the official language of religion
and law in the Empire.

The descendants of the Prophet, the ashraf

^Hourani, Arabic Thought

,

27.

Rosenthal, Judaism^_ai^^
von Grunebaum, Modern Islam 67, 244, 305.
^E. I. J.

(London, 1961), 29-32;

,

\ourani, Arabic Thought

,

262; Ma»oz, Ottoman Reform, 247.

,

were

10.

highly esteemed, and moreover, they possessed certain economic and legal
,
privileges.

10

Renowed Arab families and religious leaders of the provincial

cities fostered Arab pride in their language, cultural identity, historical memories, and unique role in Islam.

Therefore, they preserved

and, in a sense, encouraged Arab consciousness.^^

However, it was

strictly a cultural kind of "national" consciousness, lacking political
overtones.

The idea of nationalism, as a well-defined movement with

political objectives, was incompatible with the overriding loyalty of

Muslim Arabs to Islam and the Ottoman Empire--ob jects that transcended
Political allegiance to a country or nation was unknown:

nationalism.

territorial loyalty was limited to one's city or quarter, and ethnic

loyalty to one's family or tribe.

"So alien was the idea of the territorial

nation state," wrote Bernard Lewis, "that Arabic has no word for Arabia,
12

while Turkish, until modern times, lacked a word for Turkey."

Aspi-

rations among Muslim Arabs for separate political existence from the

Ottoman Empire were not crystallized until the First World War.
Muslim Arabs were, and consciously felt, very much a part of the
Empire because, among other things, it was primarily a Sunni Muslim state,

because it supported Muslim predominance, and because it esteemed their
religious leaders and acknowledged their special status in Islam.

The

Arabs.
Empire, however, meant something quite different to Christian

Muslim
Though the latter accepted the Arabic language and were part of
incorporated in
culture in the broad sense, yet they were not fully
10

Hourani, Ar abic Th oughJ:, 33, 260-61.
Ibid

.

^\ewis. The Middle East, 72-73; Lewis, Modern

Turkey,,

329

11.

that culture.

Since the beginning of Islam, non-Muslims had been classified and
treated as second-class subjects.

This practice was perpetuated by the

Ottoman Empire until the mid-nineteenth century, when it was formally
abolished by the Tanzimat edicts.

However, Muslim refusal to endorse the

Tanzimat program of equality prolonged many of the traditional disabilities
to which non-Muslims were subjected.

There were still cases of forced conversion and cases in which

Christians were prohibited from building or repairing churches.
the discriminatory poll-tax

(

After

jizya ) was eliminated by Ottoman reforms,

it was replaced by another unequal tax, the badal

,

which was levied on

all non-Muslims in lieu of military service, even though they were not

permitted to serve in the army.

Ottoman promises of more equitable

representation in government and of legal equality were

net

fully carried

out: Christians remained seriously under-represented in the provincial

and state councils; evidence presented by a Christian against a Muslim
13

was frequently discounted in Muslim courts of law.

Courts often went

as far as summarily condemning a Muslim in favor of a non-Muslim, rather

than accepting the latter'

s

evidence.

14

In one particular case, for

example, "the court endeavored to persuade the (Muslim) offender to

plead guilty and to submit to a slight punishment, rather than to

establish a precedent opposed... to their faith."
Besides being denied rights specifically granted to them by the
13

Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform

^^IJbid-,

,

189-99.

197.

Foreign
^^Quoted in Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform 196, from the British
the consulate
Office Archives, dispatch from the series F. 0. 78, from
in Damascus.
,

terras of the

Tanzlmat >

Christians also were subjected to occasional

acts of oppression and violence.

Their attempts to exploit their rights

under the Tanzimat aroused bitter ^&aslim antagonism, since Muslims refused
to recognize non-Muslim equality.

Sometimes Christians, however were

responsible for provoking Muslim hostility for reasons such as: their
open defiance of traditional Islamic social regulations; their reluctance
to pay the obligatory badal

;

their repeated violations of the consular

treaties; their close ties to certain European Pov/ers with which the

Ottoman Empire was at odds; their economic ascendancy made possible
through foreign trade and European support.

Anti-Christian activities

v;ere the

16

result of the traditionalist

Muslim cultural reaction to the idea of non-Muslim equality.

It must

be emphasized that the division betv;een Muslim and non-Muslim was the
basic social framev;ork in the Islamic world, transcending linguistic and
ethnic differences.

Conservative Muslims held that the Ottoman Empire,

as an Islamic society animated by Islamic doctrines, was obligated by

religious precept to maintain the supremacy of Islam, and therefore, to

preserve the inferior status of non-Muslims.

Moreover, they feared that

their traditional position of political and social dominance would be

subverted if Christians enjoyed equal rights.

What it meant for a

Muslim to give up his superior status is described by Bernard Lewis in
the following terms:
To give up this principle of inequality and segregation
required of the Muslim no less great an effort of
renunciation than is required of those Westerners who
are now called upon to forego the satisfactions of
16

Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform

^^Ibid., 227.

,

226-32.

13.

racial superiority. Of the two prejudices, that of
the Muslim against the infidel had stronger roots
both in tradition and in morality. The Muslim could
claim that he assigned to his inferiors a position
of reasonable comfort and security; he could moreover claim that his discrimination related not to
an accident of birth but to a conscious choice on
the most fundamental question of human existence,^

The obstacles against the full incorporation of Christians in

Ottoman society were too great to be overcome by Tanzimat aspirations
of Ottoraanism

(

Osmanlilik )--the objective of uniting all subjects on

the basis of equality under Ottoman sovereignty.

The Muslim mind,

conditioned by a history of Muslim dominance within Islam, was not yet
prepared to accept the absolute equality of non-Muslims.

Muslim in-

transigence, however, was not the only barrier against achieving Ottomanism
Some sections of the Christian Arab population did not

v?ant

to be

integrated in the Ottoman system, but instead they desired autonomy under
the protection of certain European countries.

19

Various impersonal forces perpetuated Muslim-Christian disparity.
The effects of centuries-old Ottoman discriminatory administration in

government, law, justice and taxation, compounded with the consquences
of serai-autonomous existence in the millet ,

from the Ottoman Government.

20

had estranged Christians

The millet system of sel f -administering

communities, drawn along religious lines, accentuated Christian consciousness of their separate status, and it militated against intercommunal

^^Lewis,

Modem Turkey

,

107.

^^Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 864; Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform

,

199,

218.

^^Hamilton A.
(London, 1950-57),

Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West
380.
I, 212n; "Milla," Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam
R.

,

14.

contact and Ottoman "national" solidarity

Christians had attained a

viable social existence within the limits of their own millets

,

in which

they observed their own laws, practiced their own customs, and
cherished

their own traditions.

For all these reasons they regarded the Empire

as alien to their society. 22

It was an attitude moulded by centuties,

and as such, it was too firmly established to be substantially changed in
the space of several decades of reform.

The tension between Muslim Arab and Christian Arab was revived by
the Tanzimat ferment, and it was intensified by the impact of the West.

Christian Arabs, connected to their European coreligionists through

missionary schools and through commercial activity, were able to accept
Western ideas and practices v;ithout that disquieted feeling v;hich
characterized Muslim borrowing from an unbelieving, inferior culture.

23

The work of Christian traders of Damascus, Aleppo, and the coastal

towns of Lebanon brought them into frequent contact with European life.
The predominance of Arabic-speaking Christians in the trade field is

explained by a number of factors: the traditional Muslim view of trade

was one of contempt; Christians, prior to the Tanzimat
acquire land in Syria; Christians had

a

,

could not legally

knowledge of European languages

and the advantage of consular protection.

24

The range of the consular

treaties was extended to give protection to Ottoman subjects, as well as

^^Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society , I, 212, 216, 217, 256; Albert
Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London, 1947), 19-22; A. L. Tibawi,
Religion
••The Cultural Aspect with Special Reference to Egypt and Syria,"
in the Middle East ed. A. J. Arberry (Cambridge, 1969), II, 547-48.
,

^^Sari' al-Husari, Lectu res on the Growth of Nationalist Tliought (in
Arabic), (Cairo, 1948), 17'^80.

^^Hourani, Arabic Tliought
^^Ibid., 57.

,

95.

15,

European aliens.

European consuls even supported attempts by Christian

Arabs to improve their material conditions, and to achieve greater
rights and privileges.

25

Consequently, many Christian Arabs had closer

ties with, and were more favorably disposed to the West than to the

Ottoman Empire.

Another main channel of Western influence was missionary and
educational activity.

Whereas the European experience of merchants,

travellers, and European-educated priests and scholars was limited to a

relatively small number of people, missionary

v;ork, on the

other hand,

reached large and various sections of the Christian Arab population.

France had been the traditional protector of Arabic-speaking Christians

who were under the headship of the Papacy, namely, the Maronite, Melkite
and Latin Catholics.

Russia, by a dubious interpretation of the Treaty

of Kutchuk Kainardja (1774),

26

claimed the right around mid-nineteenth

century of protecting the Orthodox Christians.

27

France was the undis-

puted leader in the founding of schools among Arab Christians, particularly
the Lebanese.

During the second half of the nineteenth century various

other Western countries, notably Britain and the United States, expanded
28

into the missionary and education field in the Arab provinces.

As will

be shown, it was from an American college in Lebanon that a high level
of intellectual ferment emerged and spread to various other regions of

the Empire.

2S

Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform , 217.

^^For the text of the treaty, see Hurewitz, Dipl omacy in the Near
and Middle East vol. 1 (Princeton, N. J., 1956), 54-61.
,

^^Hourani, Arabic Tliought , 39-40; Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform

,

215-16.

^^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York, 1946), 92-93.

16.

Lebanon was the country whose cultural and geographical circumstances
enabled it to receive the largest share of Western ideas and practices.
The Maronites of Lebanon, its dominant Christian sect, had carried on

relations with the West for centuries.

Their union with Western

Catholicism began at the time of the Crusades, and it was consolidated

by their Concordat with Rome in 1736.

In the seventeenth century they

established direct relations with France, which, as the most powerful
Catholic country of Europe, claimed the right to protect the Maronites
and other Catholic communities.

29

Lebanon's religious contact with

Europe opened the door to European cultural ideas and to greater commercial
exchange, which was abetted by Lebanon's favorable geographical location.

Western influence in Lebanon was accelerated following the Organic
Regulation of 1861,

30

which was drafted by an international commission

at the end of the 1860 civil war.

It established Mount Lebanon as an

autonomous region under a Christian governor appointed by the Porte;
thus it implicitly acknowledged and safeguarded the predominance of the
31

Christian element.
increased.

Subsequently, commercial and missionary activity

More schools were founded by the Western missions, and even

the indigenous schools were organized along European lines.

The crowning

achievement of Western education was the establishment of the Syrian
Protestant College by the Americans in 1866, later to become the American

University of Beirut, and Saint Joseph's University in 1875 by the French.
The Syrian Protestant College, in which Arabic was the language of

^^Hourani, Arabic Thought

,

39-40, 55.

Diplomacy,
^^For the text of the Organic Regulation, see Hurewitz,
vol. 1, 165-68.

^^Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent

,

242.

•

instruction, played a leading part in the revival of the Arabic
language,

history, and literature, and ultimately in the awakening of Arab
national

consciousness

32

Western currents of thought inspired the Lebanese literary revival
of the second half of the nineteenth century.

Certain Lebanese Christians,

prominently Nasif al-Yaziji, Faris al-Shidyaq, and Butrus al-Bustani,
cultivated an ardently intense love of Arabic language and literature.

With their exceptional mastery of Arabic, they endeavored to make the

necessary linguistic modifications so as to make it a suitable medium
for the expression of

modem

ideas.

Both Shidyaq (1804-1887) and Bustani (1819^1883) formed close ties
with the American Protestant missionaries and gained a knowledge of

Western languages.

Eventually, both men converted from the Maronite

faith to Protestantism, at least partly because of the greater latitude

Protestantism offered for the expression of secular ideas.

In his

writings Shidyaq admired the social cohesion and the technological
progress of the European countries.

He realized that religious affili-

ations had to be transcended in order to achieve national unity.

Like Shidyaq, Bustani was strongly influenced by European culture.
He taught that selective borrowing of European ideas and techniques was
essential for a revival of Arab civilization.

According to him, the

first objective of the Arabs should be to attain national unity on the

basis of equality and religious freedom.

solidarity was

a

His firm belief that national

prerequisite for social progress was manifested in at

least two of his actions: he named the school he founded the National

^^Antonius, Arab Awakening , 42-43; Philip
History (New York, 1967), 453-54.

K.

Hitti, Lebanon in

18.

School, in which Arabic and the modern sciences
were taught; the motto

he selected for his best known periodical was the
following statement
attributed to the Prophet, "Love of country is an article of
faith".

Bustani's national idea, however, did not suggest the creation
of an
Independent pan-Arab state.

He accepted Ottoman sovereignty as necessary

for the political stability needed by the Arab provinces for their
social

well-being.

Bustani was primarily a cultural nationalist, appealing to

common Arabic traditions, customs, language and literature, as an antidote
to the social limitations of sectarian life.

His life time objectives,

as teacher, translator, author, journalist, lexicographer and encyclo-

pedist, were to revive Arabic as the medium of enlightenment, to transcend

sectarianism, and to encourage regional social solidarity within the

framework of the Ottoman system.
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Tendencies toward secular thought among Lebanese Christians received tremendous impetus as a result of the growth of the periodical
press, which carried their ideas far beyond the borders of Lebanon.

Until

the 1860's, there had been virtually no Arabic newspapers; the only

papers of importance had been those published by the Ottoman Government
in Constantinople and Cairo.

But during the last three decades of the

nineteenth century, the increase in the number of printing presses,
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and

of the Arabic reading public, provided Lebanese Christians with the

opportunity of publicizing and disseminating modern thoughts.

Down to

^^The information in the three preceding paragraphs is taken from
Hourani, Arabic Thought , 95-102; A. L. Tibawi, "The American Missionaries
in Beirut and Butrus al-Bustani," Middle Eastern Affairs 3 (1963), 156ff.
,

printing press had been traditionally in the hands of Christians
Muslims hesitated to adopt its use out of objection to reproducing the
Qur'an, the word of God, by movable type instead of calligraphy.
^^^Itie

about 1900, Arabic periodicals, whether published
in Beirut, Cairo, or

Constantinople, vere predominantly in the hands of Lebanese
Christians,

most of whom were educated at the Syrian Protestant Col
lege.
The theme of many of the major Arabic periodicals of the
late nine-

teenth century was secularism.

Indeed the first significant Arabic

newspaper with wide circulation, Shidyaq's al-Jawa'ib (1860-1883),
propounded fresh ideas and discussed the advantages of European society.

Another pioneer newspaper, but one that advocated Westernized reforms in
more explicit terms, was al-Jinan , founded by Butrus al-Bustani in 1870.
It argued that the social and political institutions of the Arab lands

must be regenerated through reforms in the systems of education and

administrative government, and by the separation of religion from
politics.
The two most influential and best known of these Lebanese periodical

were al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal

The former was founded in Beirut in 1876

.

by two teachers of the Syrian Protestant College, Ya'qub Sarruf and
Faris Nimr.

However in 1885, just one year before the Ottoman Governmeit

suppressed al-Jinan, al -Muqtataf moved to the comparative freedom of

Cairo (under British control), where it was renamed al-Muqattam

38
.

Al-

Hilal was founded in Cairo in 1892 by Jurji Zaydan, who also had studied
at the American Protestant College.

Both of these periodicals handled

many of the same subjects already treated by Shidyaq and particularly
35
•^^

Hourani, Arabic Thought
Ibid

..

98-99.

^^ Ibid

.,

263.

,

97.

(London, 1899), 10-11,
of
69-70; Hourani, Arabic Thought , 245-46; Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence
Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1966), 59 n. 3.
•'^Martin Hartraann, The Arabic Press of Egypt

20.

Bustani-^topics such as: the importance of science or progress,
and the
role of law, morality, and religion in

modem

society.

However, their

value existed not so much in original observations as in educating

a

growing reading public in Western ideas, with the result that these
ideas

were steadily becoming commonplace. 39

They prepared the ground from

which other public advocates of Westernized reform were able to advance.
The debate between religion and science at the end of the nine-

teenth century was brought into sharper focus by other Christian Arabs
such as Shibli Shumayyil and Farah Antun.

Both men accepted the European

idea that the general welfare should be the chief goal of society and
the state, and that science is indispensable for achieving that end.

Shumayyil had studied medicine at the Syrian Protestant College and in
Paris before settling in Egypt, where he became a frequent contributor
to al-Muqattam and other similar periodicals.

In his writings he

asserted that the Ottoman Empire lacked the basic components of a healthy
society, namely, liberty, justice, and primarily scientific knowledge.

For Shumayyil, who had translated

a

German commentary on Darwin in the

1880s, a viable social organization could be sustained only adapting it-

self to the changing circumstances.

But since the society best fitted

to survive was the one in which all of its members worked for the general

good, therefore social solidarity must be achieved by shifting an

individual's loyalty from his particular religion to

a

single national

entity.

Farah Antun, another Lebanese journalist, published

philosophy of Ibn Rushd in Cairo in 1903.

^^Hourani, Arabic Thought , 246-47.
^^Ibid., 248-51.

a

book on the

He contended that the

modem

21.

age was one of science and secular philosophy, in vhich religious

dogmatism was medieval and timewom.

He advocated national unity and

the separation of religion from politics as the sine qua non of freedom,

justice, equality, progress, and true civilization.^^

The Arabic periodical press played a decisive part in publicizing
the idea of secularism as an antidote to the decay of Ottoman social

institutions.

The primary function of the Arabic press was to persuade

public opinion of the advantages and indeed the necessity of Westernized
reform.

It did not advocate action, nor did it even propose a definite

program for social improvement.

Its treatment of certain controversial

political and social issues remained general out of fear of precipitating

Hamidian repression.
The influence of the Arabic press, though relatively great, must
not be overexaggerated

.

The periodical writers were predominantly

Christians, whose ideas appealed primarily to Christians, especially
those who had imbibed secularist thought with their knowledge of English
Since the Christians existed on the margin of Ottoman

and French.

society, they had a certain objective insight into the inadequacies of
that society, and they were more inclined than Muslims to accept external
ideas.

Their frequent discussion of and deep interest in the idea of a

secular state was based on their aspirations for equal rights and
greater share in government.
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Muslim Arabs, on the other hand,

a
V7ere

scarcely influenced by ideas seeking to change the status quo that
supported the predominance of their social institutions.

They rarely

sent their children to mission schools, still preferring traditional
^^

Ibid

.,

253-58.

^^Ibid., 259.

.
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Muslim schools, or the new Ottoman state schools.
Nevertheless, the Arab literary revival did not leave
all Muslim

Arabs untouched.

Arabic periodicals frequently featured articles

celebrating the literature and culture of the Arabs, and
thus they
enlivened Arab consciousness.

Some Muslim Arabs began to become aware

of certain cultural distinctions between them and the
Ottoman Turks.

A

few of them, dissatisfied with Ottoman misgovernment , also
began to

canvass certain notions of reform.

They desired greater material

improvements and more power in provincial affairs.
not amenable to doctrines of secularism.

However, they were

The integrity of Islam was

still the first principle of their allegiance.

Moreover, prior to the

Young Turk ascendency after 1908, the number, effectiveness, and influence
of reform minded Muslim Arabs was extremely small.

The vast majority

of them continued to support the Ottoman Empire as the home and protector

of Islam.

They looked upon Europe, rather than the Empire, as an unwanted

intruder.

When a Muslim Arab reform movement eventually developed

(as will be

seen in the next chapter), Islam, not secularism, played the dominant

Muslim reformers advocated a rejuvenation of Islamic institutions

role.

and a return to the doctrines of early Islam as prerequisites for social

rehabilitations
Religious loyalty, \^ith its broad social ramifications, was a

fundamental issue dividing Muslim Arab and Christian Arab reformers.

While both groups agreed on the necessity of social reform, they differed
as to its ultimate purpose.

Whatever the political objectives of Muslim

Arab reformers were, and whatever feeling of Arab consciousness they had,
/

^

Zeine, Emergence

,

47-48 n.

2
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they still remained loyal to the Ottoman
Empire and that they entertained

no notions of separatism.

National feeling among Christian Arabs,
however, was becoming wide-

spread in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century.

Butrus al-Bustani's

advocated Syrian autonomy in the form of a
secular community.

Including Muslims, Christians and Jews, and embracing
the vilayet s of

Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, and the autonomous
_saniaks of Mount Lebanon
and Jerusalem.

This idea was supported mainly by Orthodox and Protestant

Christians educated at the American and European mission schools.

Even

though many of them were Lebanese, they favored an autonomous
Greater
Syria over an independent Lebanon, because a Lebanese state implied
the

domination of the French and their Maronite Catholic proteges.
Beyond their general aspiration for autonomy, few Christian Arabs
had a plan for action or even a program of political objectives.

The

first Arab political program to be recorded was drafted by a secret

society that had been founded in Beirut in 1875 by five Lebanese

Christians

from the Syrian Protestant College.

In 1880 this secret

society posted in Beirut, as well as other major towns of Syria, anonymous

placards accusing the Ottoman Turks of injustice and misgovemment

,

and

exhorting the Arabs to obtain, by force if necessary, the following
objectives: the autonomy of Syria in union with Lebanon; the recognition
of Arabic as an official language; the removal of censorship and other

types of repression; peace-time military service only in one's local

region.

While the leaders of the Beirut society sought above all the

^^Hourani, Arabic Though t, 274-76.

^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening

,

79-84

24.

independence of Lebanon, they felt that they needed Muslim Arab support,
and that therefore, they had to offer a broader program.

They appealed

to the idea of Arabisra as the common bond uniting Muslim and Christian

Arabs; they exploited the dissatisfaction of reform minded Muslim Arabs

with Ottoman misrule; they included the autonomy of Syria in their
political demands.

Furthermore, as members of the Masonic Lodge of

Beirut, the leaders of the Beirut society managed to persuade a few of

their fellow Muslim members to join their activities .^^
Ihe influence of the secret society, however, was slight.

Its

membership remained very small, and it was confined predominantly to a
few educated Lebanese Christians.

It decided to dissolve itself in

1882 or 1883 out of fear of Hamidian repression.
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Perhaps its greatest

significance was that it foreshadowed the eventual development of better
organized Arab separatist movements.
The attempts of the Lebanese Maronites to bring full independence
to their autonomous region, and to create a Christian state oriented to

the West, represent the only mature "nationalist" movement among Arabs
49

during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

This movement,

however, should not be misinterpreted as an Arab nationalist effort.

was

the

It

work of marginal Arabs, whose pro-French policies and exclusively

regional patriotism precluded support either from Muslim Arabs or from the

Christian Arabs who opposed a Lebanese state based on Maronite supremacy.

^^Zeine, Emergence, 60-61.

^^ Ibid

.,

66-67.

^^ Ibid

. ,

62; Antonius,

The Arab Awakening

^^Hourani, Arabic Thought, 275.

,

81
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To sum up, there were at least three divergent
directions of an

Arab movement at the turn of the century: Lebanese
Maronite nationalists
seeking to establish an independent state; groups of Lebanese
and Syrian

Christians favoring a secular, autonomous Arab community; Muslim
Arab
reformers contending that an Arab revival was necessary for the cultural

rejuvenation of Islam.^^

These movements, with the exception of the

Lebanese nationalists, were embryonic, and it was not until the consequences of the Young Turk ascendancy were felt that they came to life.
They comprised small groups of individuals whose main work centered on

publicizing, rather than acting on their objectives.

Moreover, they

aimed above all to secure reform and possibly autonomy within the

Ottoman Empire.

Only a small minority, almost entirely Christian,

sought independence.

It must be emphasized that the vast majority of

Muslim Arabs supported the Ottoman Empire as a Muslim state.
50

Albert Hourani, A Vision of History (Beirut, 1961), 88.

^^Zeine, Emergence , 52.

Ill

MUSLIM ARAB REFOR>I THOUGHT

Muslim reformers during the last quarter of the nineteenth century

were aroused by the modernizing spirit of the Tanzimat and by the increasing rate of VJestern involvement in Ottoman affairs.

Their pride

and confidence in the integrity of the Empire were shattered by a number
of setbacks at the hands of Europe, such as: the abuse of capitulatory

privileges; increasing commercial and financial control of European

creditors over certain Ottoman affairs as a result of the expanding

Ottoman debt; insurrections of Christian elements in the Balkans,

V7hich

were spurred by Russia's pan-Slav policies; Russian attacks on Muslim
domains in Central Asia; and French and British encroachments in North

Africa.^

Muslim reformers felt that the Empire's viability was

threatened externally from Europe, and internally from the discontent
among the very Christian subjects to whom the Tanzimat had made a number
of concessions, in the hope of integrating them in the Ottoman system.

2

Consequently, these reformers became disillusioned with the Westernizing

program of the Tanzimat on account of its failure either to satisfy the

^Albert Hourani, "Near Eastern Nationalism Yesterday and Today,"
Foreign Affairs XLIII, 1 (October, 1963), 127.
,

^Moshe Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestinc^_'L84 0^_861
(London, 1968), 217-18.

•26-

,
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Christian minorities, or to mitigate European
intrusions.^

Nevertheless,

they were still affected by the reform
mood, as they fully recognized
the need for social change and improvement.

They began, however, to

speak of modernization along strictly Islamic
lines, as opposed to
Western.
Late nineteenth century notions of reform among
Muslins revolved

about the integrity of Islam.

The problems of and projected solutions

for Islamic decline were formulated in religious
terras, rather than
secular or national. 4 in contrast to Christian Arab
secularizers

Muslims were not conditioned to separate religion from social
life.

For

them, Islam was the source and ideally the raison d'etre of
their

civilization; it was inseparable from the various other manifestations
of social activity.

Therefore, whatever cultural changes they contemplated

depended upon their willingness to reform the Islamic foundation of that
culture.

They felt that a revival of Islam was a necessary prerequisite

for political and social change.

Indeed, the question of the Islamic

religion represented a thread linking virtually all of the modern Muslim
thinkers, notwithstanding their differing notions on precisely how Islam

should be reformed.

Jamal al-Din al -Afghani
Islamic reformism received a reverberating stimulus from the activity
3

Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism (Los Angeles,
1968), 22-23.
4

Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London, 1964), 96.

28.

of the redoubtable Jainal al-Din

al-Afgh^ (1838-1897).^

aspects of the reform campaign of al-Afghani, who

V7as

The political

originally a

Persian, were often dissimilar to the political implications of
Muslim

Arab thought.

But his ideas on Islamic revival had a direct and

important influence on Muslim Arab reformers, especially the school of

Muhammad Abduh.
Through his writings and teachings, al-Afghani asserted that for
Islam to regain its proper place in the world it needed to return to
the original and genuine principles of early Islam, and to eschew the

later corruptions responsible for its stagnation.

Hie idealization of

primitive Islam as a golden age, and as normative, was accepted by most
of al-Afghani's followers, and it played a central role in Muslim reform

thought.^

Islam had been great in the past, argued al-Afghani, because

the faithful adhered to the basic principles of the Qur'an and the

teachings of the Prophet.

When Muslims had firmly abided by the funda-

mental truths of their faith, their interpersonal and community

relationships were truthful and trustworthy.

Al-Afghani held that the

sublime qualities engendered by right religion formed the basis of social

cohesion and a healthy community.

He idealized the strength and unity

of Islamic society in the age of the caliphs, and he ascribed its

military successes and rapid growth to the force of social solidarity
produced by the true believers.

He concluded that Islamic civilization

again could become united and could florish, if the faithful would live
^For the life and thought of al-Afghani, see Charles C. Adams, Islam
and Modernism in Egyp_t (New York, 1968), 4-17; E. G. Browne, .The Persian
Revolution (London, 1910), ch. 1; I. Goldziher, "Djamal al-Din al-Afghani,"
Encyclopedia of Islam (2nd ed.), II, 416-19; Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism:
An Antholo gy (Los Angeles, 1962), 6-15; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in
Islam^lx^Respons
the Lib(i7al Ag e, 1798-1939 (London, 1962), ch. 5;.Keddie, An
,

56.
^Wilfred C. Smith, Islam in Modern History (New York, 1957),
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their religion as it ought to be lived,^
In his "Refutation of the Materialists", published
in Paris in 1881
as an outgrowth of his controversy with Ernest Renan,
al-Afghani pro-

pounded the thesis that Islam contained the roots not only
for social
solidarity, but also for social amelioration and progress.

The ideology

of progress was a European product,^ which al-^Afghani
borrowed chiefly

from Guizot, whose History of Civilization in Europe had been recently
translated into Arabic.

Following the Enlightenment theory that progress

was based on reason, al-Afghani tried to show in his essay that Islam
was a rational religion, and moreover, the only religion conducive to
the law of progress.
The Islamic religion is the only religion that censures
belief v/ithout proof and the following of conjectures;
reproves blind submission; seeks to shov; proof of things
to its followers; everywhere addresses itself to reason;
considers all happiness the result of wisdom and clearsightedness; attributes perdition to stupidity and lack
of insight; and sets of proofs for each fundamental
belief in such a way that it will be useful to all people.
It even, when it mentions most of its rules, states their
purposes and their benefits.^^

Al-Afghani

's

feverish attempts to portray Islam as a religion fully

compatible with the demands of a modern society help to indicate the

^Keddie, An Islamic Response

,

38 and 78.

^The policy of reinterpreting certain Western ideas or practices
as original Islamic products was used by al-Afghani and other Islamic
modernists in order to fit them in their exclusive system of reconstruction
from v;ithin, and also to make them more acceptable to conservative
Muslims. On this point see G. E. von Grvmebaura, Modern Islam: The Search
for Cultural Identity (New York, 1962), 122.
^Keddie, An Islamic Response

,

172n.

^^Quoted in Keddie, Islamic Response, 172.
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central importance and indispensabil ity of
Islam to Muslim reform
activity.

His political activities in behalf of
pan-Islam cannot be

understood apart from his Islamic consciousness.

Indeed, the overall

appeal of his pan-Islamic campaign was, as
the name suggests, basically

religious in nature.

Al-afghani did not originate the doctrine of pan-Islam,
although
he did become its leading advocate in the last
teenth century.
imperialism.

tv70

decades of the nine-

Pan-Islam developed primarily in reaction to European

The first ideologists of pan-Islam apparently were a

group of intellectuals called the Young Ottomans, who in the 1870s
called for Islamic unity based on the sublime provisions of the Shari'a

Their reaction against European encroachments was accompanied by

.

a

domestic reaction against the "heretical" Westernizing programs of the
Tanzimat

.

which seemed to aggravate Ottoman disunity by giving greater

latitude to the separatist-minded Christian elements, and by acquiescing
in the growing influence of Europe, particularly conspicuous in economic

affairs.

Their ideas may well have influenced al-Alfhani, who had

knowledge of Osraanli and who had been in Constantinople from 1869 to
1871.

He shared the conviction of the Young Ottomans that Islam declined

because it abandoned the precepts of the Shari'a, and because it could
not defend itself against Western military and cultural inroads.
The need for strong Islamic unity was dramatized by the distress
felt among Muslims over the Empire's inability to respond to the appeals

^^Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal,
1964) , 216-22; Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-National ism, " Journal
of Modern History, XLI (1969), 20; Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in
the Mid-Nineteenth Century," Middle Eastcr'n Studiej;, I, 3 (April, 1965),
291-93; E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State (Cambridge,
1965) , 30-40.
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for help from their Central Asian brothers,
who were subjugated by Russia
in the 1860s and 1870s.

The nascent pan^-Islamic sentiment received
an

impetus from the examples of the successful Italian
and German unifi-

cation programs.

However, it should be emphasized that pan-Islam was

radically different from European nationalist movements, in
that it was
based on religious and not national loyalties.

Pan-Islamisra was an

ideological response to European aggression which fully comported
with

existing Muslim loyalties, whereas the notions of pan-Turkism or pan-

Arabism did not even exist as yet.
The emphasis on Islamic solidarity sharpened the focus of Muslim

loyalty on the Ottoman Sultan, as the most powerful ruler in the Islamic
vorld.

Sultan Abdul Hamid eagerly responded to the pan-Islamic climate

as he increasingly put forward the claim to be Caliph of all Sunni

Muslims.

Pan-Islam gave him the desired opportunity of consolidating

his own position as head of a more firmly united Ottoman Islamic Empire. 1
The trend toward greater Islamic identification was moving in the

direction of al -Afghani, who had been advocating defensive cultural
solidarity against European incusions through a re-emphasis of genuine
Islamic principles.

Al-Afghani had developed

a

lifelong hatred of foreign

encroachments, particularly British, since his stay in India at about
He assailed British imperial activities

the time of the Indian mutiny.

Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," 293-94.
The thesis of Keddie's "Pan-Islam as Proto-National ism" exaggerates the
importance of pan-Islam in leading to local nationalisms, while on the
other hand it minimizes the incompatibility of national loyalties with
Islamic loyalties, which were supranational.
^

^^Berkes, The Develo pment of Secularism, 255; Keddie, "Pan-Islam
as Proto-Nationalism," 20; Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire," 294.
^^Keddie, Islamic Response

,

11-12.
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in Egypt while he was there in the 1870s, and
later in Paris through al-

Urwa al^Wuthqa (The Strongest Link), the newspaper
that he and Muhammad

Abduh published in 1884*'^^
To illustrate al^Afghani's anxiety over Islamic
weakness in the face
of European imperialism, let us consider his exhortations
for direct

action.

He appealed to the traditional Islamic right of removing

rulers incapable of protecting the Islamic peoples against foreign
incursions, when he proposed, while in Egypt, that the Khedive Ismail
should be assassinated for misgovemment

,

and again when he actually

encouraged the assassin of Nasir al-Din Shah to commit his deed in 1896, 16
In view of al -Afghani's attitude, we can imagine the burning

enthusiasm with which he took advantage of the pan-Islamic mood, such
that he became probably its greatest publicist.

He labored by pen and

speech to bring about a union of all Muslims under the Sultan-Caliph, in

order to present a united and formidable front against Europe.
that the Islamic religion

v;as

Recognizing

the common, fundamental clement binding

Muslims, al-Afghani advocated the strengthening of this bond as the most

effective force of producing social cohesion and imperial strength.
These objectives were reflected in the "Refutation of the Materialists"
and in the articles of al-Urwa al-Wuthqa

,

both of which attempted to

engender pride in the social virtues and glories of Islam.

Al-Afghani

implied that when religion was the focal point of Muslim life, the
Islamic civilization flourished and excelled.

l^ibid.

,

20 and 24.

^^Haim, Arab Nationalism, 8-9.

^^Ibid., 9.

^^Keddie, Islamic Response

,

83.
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Al-Afghani's ambition was to ingratiate himself
with Sultan-Caliph
Abdul Hamid, who was already predisposed
against European interventions,
and furthermore who had already accepted
the leadership of the pan-Islamic
cause.

Al-Afghani hoped to influence Abdul Hamid to adopt
the pan-Islamic

proposals that he had drafted.

In 1885, he suggested an alliance between

Afghans, Persians, Turks, Egyptions and Arabs, with the
help of his
traditional foe Britain, to counter Russian expansion at
the expense of
the Muslims of Turkestan.

In 1892, he presented a pan-Islamic project

to Abdul Hamid, and consequently he was invited to
Constantinople in that

year.

This project, in contrast to the earlier one, was directed mainly

against the British.

It proposed an alliance of all Muslims, including

those of India, to expel the British from Muslim domains, and to block

further Western encroachments against the Islamic world.

Al-Afghani's pan-Islamic schemes never materialized, and the movement
itself never got off the ground, as it remained more an expression of
a striving than a systematic plan for action.

Yet his significance is

to be found not in concrete achievements, but rather in the tone he set

for many subsequent Muslim reform thinkers.

He brought Islamic cultural

consciousness into focus, and he helped to accentuate Islamic resentment
of European power.

He advocated the feasibility of enlightened reform

from within, as opposed to blind imitation either of accepted patterns or
of European ways.

His ideas on cultural revival and a renevjed Islamic

Empire appealed to the nascent spirit of Muslim defensive cultural

1

9

Nikki R. Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and AbdulHamid II," Middle Eastern Studies III, 1 (October, 1966), 52-65; Jacob
Landau, "al -Afghani s Pan-Islamic Project," Islamic C ulture, XXVI, 3
(July, 1952), 51-52.
,
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solidarity.

20

Sylvia Haim has aptly sun-onarized al-Aghani's seminal
role

in the cause of Islamic reform:

What al-Afghani did was to make Islam into the mainspring
of solidarity, and thus he placed it on the same
footing
as other solidarity-producing beliefs. His political
activity and teaching combined to spread among the
intellectual and official classes of Middle Eastern Islam
a secularist, meliorist, and activist attitude toward
politics, an attitude the presence of which was essential,
before ideologies such as Aran nationalism could be
accepted in any degree.
It is this which makes al-Afghani
so important a figure in modern Islamic politics.

Muhammad Abduh
Many of al-Afghani

's

ideas on Islamic cultural rejuvenation were

taken up and disseminated by the more profound Muhamrnad Abduh (1849-1905),

who became probably the most influential modernist in Islam.

A native

of Egypt, Abduh had been a pupil of al-Afghani during the latter'

years in Cairo in the 1870s, and he helped al-Afghani publish al-Un<ra
al-Wuthqa in Paris in 1884.

While under al-Afghani 's direct influence,

Abduh had been politically active by

v;ay

of writing anti-European

articles, and of supporting by pen and word of mouth the al-Arabi revolt
(1881-1882) against the Khedival Administration of Egypt and its ties with
the British.

23

^^Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal," 50; Smith, Islam in Modern
History , 54-56.
^^Haim, Arab Nationalism

15.

,

^^For the life and thought of Abduh, see Adams, Islam and Modernism
18-176; Osman Amin, Muhammad Abduh trans. Charles Wendell (Washington,
1953); Hourani, Arabic Thought ch. 6; Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform:
The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida
(Los Angeles, 1966), ch. 4; "Muhammad Abduh," Encyclopedia of Islam
(2nd. ed.), I, 405-407.
,

,

^^For a brief account of the Arabi revolt, see Robert Q Collins and
Robert R. Tignor, Egypt and the Sudan (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966),
81-85.
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Abduh's predominant concerns, however, were eventually focused

upon religious, ethical and social matters.

His two most important

works are basically religious: Risalat al-Tawhid

(

Treatise on the Unity

of God ), which is his major theological work, and Al-Islam wa al-

Nasraniyya ma'al-Ilm wa al-Madaniyya
Respect to Science and Civilization )

(

,

Islam and Christianity Compared with

which is a defense of the greater

compatibility of reason and revelation in Islam than in Christianity.
In both works he argued that reason and the Islamic religion are mutually

corroborative, non-contradictory paths to the truth, and moreover that

Islam encourages the development of free inquiry and science.

Abduh declared that Islam must adapt itself to the modern scientific
outlook if it wished to preserve its viability and to enter into the
spirit of social progress.

But he opposed blind imitation of the

of European life as a cure for the ills of Muslim society.

25

v;ays

Instead

he idealized early Islam, as al-Afghani had done, and he advocated a
a general

restoration of its pristine truths as the preparatory phase for
Islamic revival.

Abduh contended that, since Islam had become vitiated

partly as a result of the practice of tagl id --the blind acceptance of

doctrines from generation to generation on the authority of the religious
community, it was essential to re-introduce as a counter-measure the
right of

i

itihad --free and independent investigation.

of the right of ijtihad

,

For justification

he appealed to the most inviolable source in

Islam, the Qur'an: "How far those who believe in tagl id are from the

^'^Adams,

Islam and Modernism

25

Amin, Muhammad Abduh

,

,

127-43; Kerr, Islamic Reform

29.

^^Adams, Islam and Modernism, 130-32.

,

108-110.
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guidance of the Qur'an.

It propounds its lavs in a way that prepares
us

to use reason, and makes us people of insight...

It forbids us to

submit to taqlid ."^^

Abduh's objective of interpreting Islam, through the method
of
exclusive selection, as a religious system conducive to free in-

vestigation was to show that it contained the necessary formulas for
religio-social modernization.

What was needed to break contemporary

Islamic inertia, and to once again s^t Islam on the path of progress,

was a revitalization of the truths of the Qur'an. 28

Abduh's focus on the incomparable value of the principles of
primitive Islam led to this important development: emphasis on the
unique role of the Arabs in Islam.

Abduh came to stress the Arab

character of the Qur^an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.

He

taught that a thorough and precise knowledge of the Arabic language, as
well as of the history and practices of the Arabs, were prerequisites
for understanding the intention of the Book.

Accordingly, he went on to

conclude that a revival of Arabic studies was essential to discover the
truth of Islam, and thus to regenerate Muslim society.

Abduh maintained that true Islam was the original product of the
Arabs, who furthermore had proficiently preserved it.

He connected

the spread of the practice of taqlid and social obscurantism with the

ascendancy of Turkish rule.

He even dated the beginning of the decline

of Islam to the time when the Abbasid Caliph, probably al-Mutasim

^^Quoted from Abduh 's Commentary on the Qur'an in Adams, Islam and
Modernism , 130.
^^ Ibid

.,

142-43.

^^C. Ernest Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an
Ideology," The Review of Politics , XXIII, 3 (July, 1961), 389-90.
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(833-42), introduced the use of Turkish mercenaries who
eventually seized

power and established military despotism.

He held that the Turks,

lacking a full understanding of Arabic language and culture,
could not

grasp the true meaning of the Qur'an and the Sunna.

They preserved

their political autocracy by closing the door of ijtihad, and by making
their subjects accept beliefs and doctrines that were often extraneous
to the spirit of the Shari'a

He concluded that the Turkish tradition

.

of despotic government and unintelligent theology have continued through

Ottoman rule.

Although supporting the Ottoman Empire as the most

effective protector of Islam, nevertheless Abduh, arguing on similar
grounds as al-Afghani, asserted that if the ruler's actions were unjust
and contrary to the principles of the Shari'a

,

the people have a right

to depose him in the interests of public welfare. 31

Abduh was the first influential Muslim Arab thinker to juxtapose
Arabs and Turks, and to compare the former favorably against the latter.
This policy was accepted and amplified by certain other important Muslim

Arab reformers.
Abduh'

s

It marked an early step in the emergence of Arab consciousness.

preconceived case for the inviolability of strict Islamic

doctrines was based, however, on a precarious foundation.

He fallaciously

projected on the Turks the responsibility for closing the door of ijtihad

with its consequential negative ramifications, a responsibility that
actually belonged to the orthodox Muslim religious leaders.

In the

eleventh century the scholastic theologians succeeded in establishing

Ash'arism as the officially recognized theology of Sunni Islam.

It is

^^Haim, Arab Nationalism , 21.

^^Hourani, Arabic Thought
149.

,

150, 151, 158; Kerr, Islamic Reform ,

38.

an authoritarian system, demanding the
passive, unquestioning acceptance
of its interpretation of Divine Revelation.

It marked the end of free

inquiry and speculation in theology, as well as
in philosophy and in the
natural sciences. "^^

Rashid Rida

Muhammad Abduh's ideas on the necessity of

a

Muslim Arab revival

for religio-social reform were adopted and elaborated by his
devoted
pupil. Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935).^^

Rida was born near Tripoli.

Lebanon, of a family that belonged to the ashraf class, that is.
those

believed to be descended from the Prophet.
al-Urwa al-Wuthga

,

particularly in its emphasis on the social implications

of the Islamic religion.

Rida's cause, one that was becoming recurrent

in the Islamic modernist movement,

culture.

He was deeply influenced by

v;as

the regeneration of Islamic

This furnished the underlying theme of his journal al-Manar

,

which he established in 1898 in Cairo, where he remained for the rest
of his life.

Rashid Rida adopted the formula for reform already seen in al-

Afghani and Abduh: the necessity of a return to the principles and the
practices of the great ancestors or elders

(

salaf )

,

as a remedy for the

maladies of Islamic social institutions, and as a prerequisite for
progress and amelioration.

All three modernists used the past as the

^^H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (New York, 1962), 118; Bernard Lewis,
The Arabs in History (New York, 1960), 142-43.
see Adams, Islam and Modernism
ch. 9; Kerr, Islamic Reform chs. 5 and

^-^For the life and thought of Rida,

ch. 8; Hourani, A rabic Thought ,
6.

^^von Grunebauiii, Modern Islam, 279-80n.

,

,
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authoritative and archetypal model for reform.

It represented to them

the quintessence of Muslim power and glory achieved
under the pristine

rulership of the Prophet and the first four caliphs, or
the RightlyGuided Caliphs.

ITiey

ruled out modernization along Western lines as a

possible alternative to emulation of the past for at least two
reasons:

much of the reform energy originally sprang from the Islamic cultural
reaction to Western intrusions

;

Islamic principles enjoined on true

Muslims the obligation to eschew the alien ways of unbelieving peoples.
These thinkers also excluded as a basis for reform the beliefs and

practices of the long intervening centuries between classical Islam and
the present, since those centuries already had been indicted for the

predicament of contemporary Islam.

A passage from Professor G. E.

von Grunebaum's Modern Islam illustrates the similarity between Islamic
and Western views of the medieval ages:
The view of history which is implied in this attitude
bears close resemblance to that of the West from the
Renaissance onward, when the Middle Ages were
depreciated as an interruption of the true growth of
civilization and a direct connection v;as established
between antiquity and the modem era, with the intervening period decried as a regrettable and shameful
lapse.

The salaf iyya ^Zthe movement to return to the ways of classical Islam-

can be interpreted as the reaction of a grovjing body of Muslim reformers
to a feeling of inadequacy.

In a sense, they replaced their receding

^^ibid., 32-33.

^^Ibid., 112.

^^This concept was not entirely new in Islam. The Wahhabi movement
In Arabia in the eighteenth century urged a revival of the original truths
of the first generation of Muslims, and the elimination of the later
unorthodox innovations. See Hourani, Arabic Thought, 37-38.

i
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feeling of cultural superiority, which was shaken by external
encroachments
and internal decay, with the dangerous illusion that contemporary
needs
and aspirations could be fulfilled by recapturing the exemplary past.^^

Implicit in this attitude was a fundamental contradiction between the

adherence to a law of progress and the belief that the first centuries
of Islam marked the highest level of history,

39

Rashid Rida became the unrivaled intellectual leader of the

salaf iyya movement.

He was a Hanbalite, the most conservative of the

four schools of Muslim theology, and he was a stricter salaf

Afghani and Abduh.

40

than al-

He put much sharper focus than they on the period

of the first four caliphs, to the virtual exclusion of the medieval

orthodox Muslim religious institution.

The logical implication of this

was that Rida*s ideal Islam was unambiguously the Islam of the Arabs.

For him, the essential, indeed the only truths of Islam were contained
in the Qur'an and formulated in the doctrines of the Prophet and the

The subsequent beliefs and rituals were superstitious,

Companions.

mystical and corrupt accretions deviating from genuine Islamic precepts.

41

Rida said that Muslims, to emerge from their stagnant situation, should

return to the practices "of the early days of the first four caliphs,

whose Sunna, together with his own Sunna, the Prophet commanded Muslims
to hold fast to, and they should lay aside everything that has been

introduced into Islam that is contrary to that practice."

^®von Grunebaum, Modem Islam
^^Ibid.

,

,

42

108 and 123.

118n.

^^Haim, Arab Nationalism , 20-21.

^^Adams, Islam and Modernism

,

188-91; Hourani, Arabic Thought_, 230.

^^Quoted in al-Manar from Adams, Islam and Modernism

,

191.
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Rida, like Abduh, supported the sultanate out of
necessity as the

most capable defender of Islam, but he denied its
legitimacy as a caliphate,
which, he asserted, belonged de jure to the Muslim
religious institution.
The Ottoman sultan could not interpret correctly the aims of
the laws
and traditions of Islam because he did not have knowledge of
the Arabic

language. 43

1

Consequently, what was needed to restore right religion

and to regain the spirit of early Islamic greatness was a regeneration
of Arabic culture.

In focusing on the necessity of an Arab renascence

to rebuild Islamic society, Rida came to stress the priority of the

Arabs over the Turks.

In his article "The Turks and the Arabs", published

in al-Manar in 1900, Rida stated:
It is in the countries which were conquered by the Arabs
that Islam spread, became firmly established and
prospered. Most of the lands which the Turks conquered
were a burden on Islam and the Muslims, and are still
a warning of clear catastrophe.
I am not saying that
those conquests are things for which the Turks must be
blamed or criticized, but I want to say that the greatest
glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs, and
that religion grew, and became great through them; their
foundation is the strongest, their light is the brightest,
and they are indeed the best umma brought forth to the

world. ^5
It should be understood that Rida, in praising the Arabs at the

expense of the Turks did not advocate or even envision an Arab national

movement toward political separatism.

He continued to reaffirm the

traditional hierarchy of loyalties in which Islam held priority over

Arabism, and in which all Muslims were brothers regardless of ethnic or

^^Hourani, Arabic Thought

,

240.

^^Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism," 391-92.

^^Quoted in Haim, Arab Nationalism

,

22-23.

42.

linguistic differences.^^

For him, as for most Muslims, the Islamic

vorld was a single cultural unit represented
by the Ottoman Empire.

When he criticized the Ottoman authorities and
praised the Arabs, it was
because he felt that the Arabs were better Muslims.
Nevertheless, Rida's juxtaposition of Arabs and Turks
had repercussions
not originally intended by him.

It exposed to some minds that the Arab

community was ethnically and historically different from
the Turkish,
that the original umma was Arab, and that perhaps the
Arabs should be

recognized as a separate nation.

Abd al -Rahman al-Kawakibi
Rashid Rida's theories on the pre-eminence of the Arabs in Islam

were given fuller content in the words of Abd al -Rahman al-Kawakibi
(1849-1902).

Kawakibi, who was of the ashraf class, worked as

a

public

official and a journalist in his native Aleppo until he was imprisoned
for speaking out against the local Ottoman authorities.^^

H6 found it

expedient to move to Cairo in 1898, where he joined to the circle of

Abduh and Rida, and contributed articles to al-Manar

.

His diagnosis of

the ills afflicting Islam, which were generally those already expounded

by Abduh and Rida, are incorporated in his Tabai' al-istibdad

(

The

Characteristics of Tyranny ), and Umm al-qura (another name for Mecca). 49

^^von Grunebaum, Modern Islam
^'^Haim, Arab Nationalism ,

,

280n, 297.

23.

^^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York, 1946), 95; Hourani,
Arabic Thought 271.
,

^^These works are not original. Tabai' al-istibdad was virtually
lifted from the Italian writer Alfieri's Delia Tirannide (1777), and Umm
al-qura was probably adapted from W. S. Blunt's The Future of Islam (1882).
For a discussion of this matter, see Sylvia G. Haim, "Al fieri and alKawakibi," Oricnte Moderno, XXXIV (1954), 321-34; idem., "Blunt and alKawakibi," Oriente Moderno, XXXV (1955), 132-43.
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He found the chief causes of Islamic decay
inherent in the introduction
of alien and deviant beliefs.

He followed the path of his predecessors

in launching assaults on the Turkish experience in
Islam, on vhich he

placed much of the responsibility for the deplorable condition
of Islamic
culture.

However, Kawakibi attacked Turkish despotism much more severely and

acrimoniously than Rida and certainly than Abduh.
sharper distinction between Arabs and Turks.

Moreover, he drew a

He concluded that, since

the whole history of Turkish rule down to the Ottomans^^ was responsible

for stifling Islamic progress, the task of regeneration must be assumed

by the Arabs-- the true, original Muslims.^^

Ihe reasons Kawakibi adduced

for asserting that the Arabs, especially those of the Arabian Peninsula,
are the only possible instrument to effect the restoration of right

religion are the following: Islam originated with them and is deeply
rooted among them; they are its foundation and its most zealous adherents;
they have preserved its purity and eschewed alien corruptions brought
in by foreign races; and their tongue is the language of the Sacred

Qur'an.^^

Although Abduh and Rida had already assailed Ottoman religious and
social obscurantism, and had called for an Arab revival, Kawakibi was
the first writer, other than Ibn Abdul Wahhab in the eighteenth century,

53

Kawakibi

to deny outright the religious authority of the Ottoman Sultan.

^^Kawakibi, like other Muslim Arab aplogists, often passed over the
distinctions between earlier Turkish Islamic dynasties and the Ottoman
Empire.
^^Haim, Arab Nationalism , 26; Hourani, Arabic Thought

,

272.

^^Sylvia G. Haim, "Blunt and al-Kawakibi," Oriente Moderno
133-34.
^^On the Wahhabis see footnote 37

above.

,

XXV (1955),

44.

demanded that the caliphate rightly belonged
to an Arab of the line of
Quraish (the tribe of Muhaimad) to be installed
at Mecca.

The Arab caliph

would have religious authority over all Muslims,
but, contrary to early
caliphal rule, his political authority would be
limited to the Hijaz.
Each regional entity of the Ottoman Empire would have
administrative and

political autonomy.
The "national" suggestions of Kawakibi's ideas on the
pre-eminence
of the Arabs have been exaggerated by two prominent writers
on Arab

nationalism, namely, George Antonius and Sylvia Haim.55

Kawakibi's

assertions that the Ottoman sultans were not legitimate caliphs, and
that the caliphate belonged to the Arabs and ought to be returned to
them, were absolutely not intended as Arab nationalist appeals, nor were

they received as such.^^

His explicit statement that the caliph would

have only religious authority over
the notion of a pan-Arab state.

a

multinational Islamic world precluded

The caliph would be a kind of Islamic

pope rather than an Arab Islamic emperor.
Moreover, Kawakibi's reasons for assailing the Ottoman Empire

stemmed more from self-interested than ideological motives.

belonged to the class of the ashraf

,

Kawakibi

which, by virtue of its descent

from the Prophet, historically had enjoyed privileged economic and social

^^Haim, "Blunt and al -Kawakibi
272-73.

^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening
27 and 29.

," 132;

,

Hourani, Arabic Thought

,

95-98; Halm, Arab Nationalism ,

^^Sati' al-Husri, Lectures on the Growth of Nationalist Thought
Likewise the Wahhabis, though rejecting the
(Cairo, 1948), passim
authority of the Ottoman sultan, appealed to Islamic and not Arab
solidarity; see Hourani, Arabic Thought , 38.
.

.

^5.

advantages. 57

However, the elevated position of the ashraf
gradually

was being eroded by the effects of Ottoman
centralization during the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whereby
"the Ottoman sultans

began attracting to themselves all the elements of
power hitherto
diffused among a crowd of landed families, tribal shaikhs,
and privileged
CO

corporate orders."^

Opposition of ashraf elements to the Ottoman

government was particularly acute during the reign of Abdul Hamid,^^
who

resolutely pursued centralization by extending the network of railroads
and the system of state-supported schools in the Arabic speaking
provinces,
and by demanding that Osmanli Turkish replace Classical Arabic in
the

government schools and administrative offices.

More particularly, Kawakibi had first hand experience of the loss
of familial privilege when the family of Abdul Hamid's court astrologer

and religious adviser, Abu'l-Huda al-Sayyadi, successfully challenged
the Kawakibis for the post of naqtb al-ashraf (head of the ashraf) of

Aleppo.

This, in spite of the fact that the religious families of Aleppo

doubted Abu*l-Huda*s claim to be of the ashraf .^^

Kawakibi

's

This event as well as

prison term indicate that one of his principal reasons for

rejecting the authority of the Ottoman caliphate lay in his personal

antipathy tovjard the Hamidian regime.

A discussion of Kawakibi and the ashraf class is located in John
Batutu, "Some Preliminary Observations on the Beginnings of Communism
in the Arab East," in Jaan Pennar (ed.), Islam and Communism (Munich and
New York, 1960), 52-55; George E. Kirk, "The Arab Awakening Reconsidered,"
Middle Eastern Affairs XII, 6 (June-July, 1962), 164-65.
,

CO

Batutu, 0£^ cit
^^Ibid.

,

,

53.

53-54.

^^Peter Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1 922 (New York, 1966),
257; Hourani, Arabic Ittought, 271.

46.

It had been Ottoman encroachments upon the traditional pre-

rogatives of the ashraf class that constituted the underlying cause
not only of Kawakibi's dissent, but moreover the dissent of many other

important Arab figures of that class.

Significantly, many of the

prominent anti-Ottoman radical dissidents, including Rashid Rida,
Sayyid Talib of Basra, and Sharif Husain of Mecca, were from the ashraf

They were not pan-Arabists in the political sense suggested

class.

by Antonius and Haim, but rather they

v/ere

devotees of the old order

seeking to preserve above all the local autonomy of the Arabic speaking
towns, in order to maintain their own privileged interests.

Nevertheless

they as well as certain other Arab reformers gave air to certain ideas

which came to be acted upon in the early part of the twentieth century:
ideas such as the incompetent and illegitimate rule of the Ottoman

sultans, the priority of the Arabs in Islam, and the justness of an Arab

caliphate and local Arab autonomy.
Nineteenth century Muslim Arab reformers were not political
activists.
social.

The fundamental character of their reform thought was religio

Their quasi-national ideas, advanced at the close of the nine-

teenth century, fell largely on unresponsive ears, as the vast majority
of Muslim Arabs still passively acquiesced in Ottoman authority.

Their

emphasis on Arabism was still intimately connected with the religious
faith, and as such it lacked nationalist overtones.

An Arab nationalist

until
movement of well-defined political aims did not maturely develop

reaction to the Turkifithe second decade of the twentieth century, as a
of the stimulus it
cation policies of the Young Turks, and as a result

^^Batutu, 0£. cit

. ,

52.

47.

received from World War

I

and the post-war settlements.

Actually, the

most vehement political opposition to the Ottoman
Government at the end
of the nineteenth century and the first years of the
twentieth came not

from the Arabs, but rather from the Turks themselves.
62

Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut.
~

1966), 73.

IV

THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST ARAB
SOCIETIES

Domestic and foreign events of the last quarter of
the nineteenth

century stimulated disenchantment toward the Ottoman
Government among
elements of the Turkish military colleges and the Westernized
bureaucracy

Turkish reformers of the Western tradition became estranged from
the
ruling dynasty after Abdul Hamid in 1877 had prorogued Parliament
and
scrapped the Constitution of 1876.

Fear of the regime's incapacity to

hold the Empire together mounted in the wake of recurrent Balkan insur-

rections, the disastrous consequences of the Russian-Turkish War, the

French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, and the establishment of the

British protectorate over Egypt in 1882.
The first organized opposition to Abdul Hamid was formed in 1889

by a group of students at the Imperial Military Medical School in
Constantinople.

The express purpose of their association was to over-

throw Abdul Hamid.

They were inspired by Western ideas of modernism,

emanating largely from Paris.

This opposition movement spread rapidly

from the Military Medical School to other government higher schools in

Constantinople, among them the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the
Civil College, and the Engineering School.

But before long, certain

conspirators fell under the v;atchful eye of the Hamidian espionage system
As a consequence, some of them found it expedient to leave the country.

-48-
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and by 1894-95 a steadily growing
number escaped to Europe, chiefly
Paris.
In Paris these refugees established
contact with an already assembled
small group of Ottoman anti-Hamidians

Ghanem and Ahmet Riza.

Ghanem was

a

.

Chief among them were Khalil

Lebanese Maronite from Beirut who

had been a delegate to the first Turkish
Parliament in 1878, but had
fled to Paris after Abdul Hamid had prorogued
the Parliament.

he founded the journal La Jeune Turque.

In Paris

Ahmet Riza's amenability to

Westernized reform was rooted in his social background.

His mother was

Austrian and his father was a man of Western tasts, and he
himself had
received part of his education in France.

Together with Ghanem and a

number of other exiles, Ahmet Riza published the paper Mashwara
(Consultation), which first appeared in 1895, and which became the organ
of these "Young Turks."

Their program called for the overthrow of

Abdul Hamid, social and political reforms for the entire Empire, the

Ottomanization of the disparate social forces of the Empire, and the
preservation of Imperial integrity.^
Meanwhile in Constantinople, discontent with the Hamidian government
was increasing.

The British ambassador in Constantinople reported in

November 1895 that placards assailing Abdul Hamid 's rule were posted on
the chief mosques of the capital.

suspected seditious elements.

2

A series of arrests were made on

Finally, the malcontents decided to

attempt a coup d'etat on August, 1896.

However, the projected coup was

uncovered before it was able to materialize, and exile to the remote

^Ernest Rarasaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of
1908 (Princeton, 1957), 14," 17, 21-25.
Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1966),
74.
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parts of the Empire became the fate of the conspirators.-'

Paradoxically, it was not the failure or the consequences of
the

projected coup of 1896 that immobilized the activities of the
Young
Turks; rather it was their own decision to abandon the struggle
against
the Sultan.

The defection of the very popular Young Turk leader Murat

Bey and his followers in 1897 paralyzed the anti-Hamidian movement for
several years.

They exchanged their revolutionary aims for Hamidian

promises of reform from above and of

a

for all political prisoners and exiles.

guarantee of complete amnesty
Furthermore, Murat Bey believed

that his aspirations for a new Islamic Empire might be realized by

attaching himself to the Sultan.

4

When the Young Turk movement began

to regain its strength after

1900, its activities were concentrated outside of the Ottoman Empire,

since internal agitation was precluded by the inhospitable political

climate of Constantinople.

And after 1900, the Young Turk reformers

were forced to give more and more attention to the vociferous grievances
of the subject nationalities, particularly the national ist^inspired

Armenian and Balkan peoples.^
Among the Arabs, nationalistic feeling was scarce, since the vast

majority of Muslim Arabs remained loyal to the sultan-caliph as
of religious principle.

a

matter

Nevertheless, there were a few Arab opposition

societies existing prior to the Young Turk Revolution that are worthy of
mention.

Thore was the "Turko-Syrian Reform Committee," whose objectives

^Ramsaur, The Young Turks

,

26,

30-33.

^

45-50; Ahmed Amin, The Development of Modern Turkey as
Ibid
Measured by its Press (New York, 1914), 68.
.

,

^Ramsaur, The Young Turks

,

61-62.
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as its name implies, vere for reform and greater
harmony between the

Syrian provinces and the central government.^
In 1903 a young group of Muslim Arabs of Damascus founded
the

Halaqat D imashq al-Saghira (the Damascus Circle).

While this society

had been established primarily to promote the study of Arabic language

and literature, it increasingly came to concern itself with political
issues, such as decentralized government and the recognition of Arabic
as an official language in the law courts and in the government schools

and offices of the Arab provinces.

Some of these young men went on to

study in Constantinople, where in 1906 a few of them founded the secret

society JamHyyat al-Nahda al-Arabiyya (the Society of the Arab Awakening),
and then helped to establish a branch in Damascus.

In fact, Damascus

remained the center of the activities of the Jam' iyya*

s

young Damascene

intellectuals, in spite of its foundation at Constantinople.

The

Jam' iyya disseminated knowledge of Arab history and literature, and it

covertly discussed political problems and aspirations of the Arab
provinces.^

The importance of these first Arab societies lies less in

their actual influence, than in their indication of emerging tendencies
toward greater Arab consciousness.

Another Arab group of pre-Young Turk Revolution years, but one with
clear and well-defined nationalist aims, was the Ligue de la patrie arabe
founded by Najib Azouri, a Syrian Christian who had studied in Paris.
The Ligue's program was conspicuously contained in Azoury's Le Reveil de
la Nation Arabe

^Ibid.

,

,

published in French at Paris in 1905.

It advocated the

63-64.

^Elie Kedourie, "Hizb,'* Encyclopedia of Islajn (2nd ed.), Ill, 519;
Al-Amir Mustafa al-Shihabi, Al -Qawmiyatu 1 Arabiyy a (Cairo, 1958-59),
52 and 55.
'

,
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creation of a new Arab Empire extending from the Tigris and the
Euphrates
to the Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea.

It called

for the division of spiritual and temporal power, by urging the
creation
of an Arab constitutional monarchy based on religious freedom and
political

equality, as well as the creation of a "spiritual" caliphate with

religious authority over the Islamic world.

Egypt lay outside the

boundaries of Azoury's Arab nation, since, as he maintained, it belonged
not to the Arab but to the Berber family, and also since they were
o

separated from the Arab Empire by a natural frontier.
•

It appears that the Ligue had little direct influence among the

Arabs, and its short-lived monthly periodical, L' Independence Arabe

ceased publication in about 1907. 9
the Ligue seem apparent.

,

Reasons for the meager influence of

For one thing, Azoury wrote in French, at

Paris, not in Arabic or in his native land.

His political views were

representative of some Christian Arabs, but hardly any Muslim Arabs.
His bid for the separation of civil from religious sovereignty was

anathema to the Muslim system of law.

His clamor for complete Arab

independence fall largely on deaf ears, even among Christian Arabs.

Although small groups of the latter, mostly Lebanese, wanted regional
independence, almost none of them shared the idea of a centralized pan-

Arab state.

As for the Muslim Arabs, the bulk of them still acquiesced

in Ottoman rule, while small numbers

v/ho

agitated, did so for reform and

improvement within the Ottoman Empire, and not independence.

^English translation of the nationalist manifesto contained in Le
Revei l is found in Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Los
Angeles, 1962), 81-82.
^Albert Hourani, Arabic Thou ght in the Liberal
(London, 1962), 278; Kedourie, "Hizb,'' 519.
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The initiative for radical political change came
not from the Arabs

or from any of the other subject nationalities,
but from the Turks.

A

new feature of the Young Turk movement after 1900
was the program

espoused by Prince Sabaheddin, a relative of the Sultan
who had emigrated
to Europe with his father and brother in 1899.

Sabaheddin contended

that the interests of the Ottoman Empire could best be
served by

.

compromising with the national aspirations- of the subject nationalities.
To Ahmet Riza's policies of centralization and Ottomanization,
Sabaheddin

opposed a program for an Ottoman federation in which the provinces would

have a great measure of autonomy.

In their quest for reaching some sort

of an agreement and unity on the question of action against Abdul Hamid,

and on the problem of the nationalities, the Young Turks arranged two

conventions, both in Paris, one in 1902 and the other in 1907.

Repre-

sentatives of the Riza and Sabaheddin factions, as well as Arabs, Kurds,
Greeks, Armenians, Albanians, Circassians, and Jews attended both

conventions.

There was agreement on the deposition of Abdul Hamid and

the need for a constitution.

But there was no unanimity on the question

of the place of the various nationalities in the Empire.

Ottoman attempts at compromise and conciliation were almost bound
to fail.

The Christian nationalities, especially the Armenians, felt

no attachment to a Muslim state headed by a Turkish sultan.
not be conciliated by Sabaheddin'

s

They would

proposals for an Ottoman federation,

as they sought complete independence from the Empire.

^^Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal,
1964), 311 and 313; Hourani, Arabic Thought 265.
,

^^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1968), 204;
Ramsaur, The Young Turks 72.
,
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The Turks, for their part, were becoming increasingly
intransigent.

The opposing forces advocating Ottomanization on the
one hand, and

decentralized government on the other ,. became polarized after
the Paris

Convention of 1902.

During the next few years the Riza faction became

predominant, for its program of centralized government and the
amalgamation
of the various races was attuned to the nascent spirit of Turkish

nationalism which was then emerging within the Empire.

'^^

The nationalistic

activities among the Armenians and among the Balkan peoples, the
recurring Russian encroachments in the Balkans, the rumors of dis-

memberment at the hands of the European powers, had embittered many
Turks, 1

who now distrusted notions of decentralization, preferring to

guard the Empire's integrity through consolidation.

The increasing

participation of the military in the Young Turk movement meant greater
support for centralism.
It was among Turkish military elements, rather than the Young Turk

exiles or the almost defunct opposition in Constantinople, that the anti-

Hamidian movement became most active by 1906-1907.

In 1906 revolutionary

cells were established among Turkish officers serving in provincial
regions.

A group of disaffected officers formed in 1906 in Damascus

the secret group "Fatherland and Freedom Society."

From Damascus the

society expanded to Jaffa and Jerusalem, and thence to Salonika in
Macedonia which became the society's center of activity.

By 1907 new

15
groups were organized in various other regions of Macedonia and Anatolia.

^^Ramsaur, The Young Turks

,

93.

^^Zeine, The EmerRence

,

77.

l^Lewis, Modern Turkey

,

204-205.

^^Ibid., 205-206; Ramsaur,

I1ie

Young Turks

,

95-99

8
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The causes of disenchantment in the Turkish officer ranks stemmed

from both patriotic and personal motives.

The twin fear of particularism

and imperialism cried for a refashioned government and a rejuvenated

army.

The dishonest system of promotion, the intolerable espionage

network, the shabby uniforms and obsolete weapons, and the fact that pay

was constantly in arrears, were some of the causes of grievance on the
part of the officer corps.
In 1907 the Salonika group joined the Paris group in a society

known as the Committee of Union and Progress.

Their fundamental purpose

was to depose Abdul Hamid and to restore the constitution.
there was very little coordination between the groups.

However,

Organizational

work and plans for action in Salonika moved far ahead and independently
of the Paris group.

However, it was not premeditated plans but rather spontaneous

military strikes for adjustment of grievances that ultimately produced
In 1907 a wave of mutinies had erupted in

the Young Turk Revolution.

Anatolia, and by 1908 they were spreading in Macedonia.

After the Sultan's

delegate entrusted with the task of putting down the mutiny in Macedonia
had been killed, the mutiny spread rapidly from one unit of the Tliird
The Sultan's attempts to turn back the incipient

Army Corps to the next.

revolution through military repression, espionage, and bribery failed.
Tlie

Committee of Union and Progress came out and supported the mutineers'

bid for the restoration of the constitution.

Yielding to the Young Turk

pressure, Abdul Hamid re-procl aimed the 1876 Constitution.

l^Lewis, Modern Turkey

^^Ramsaur,

TIt^ .'^'^""^^

,

1

Freedom

205-206, 115-17.

Turks, 122-29.

Revolution,
l^For a survey of the events culminating in the Younc Turk
Young Turk s, 94-139.
sec Lewis, Modern Turkey 205-209; Ramsaur, Hie
,
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of speech, press, and assembly, the abolition of
the espionage system,

and full amnesty of all political exiles were promised.

The joyous

and hopeful reaction among the Empire's minorities is illuminated
in the

oft-quoted words of Henry H. Jessup: "The whole empire burst forth in
universal rejoicing.

The press spoke out.

Public meetings were held,

cities and towns decorated, Moslems were seen embracing Christians and
Jews, and inviting one another to receptions and feasts. "^^

Publications

of the time in the Arabic-speaking provinces expressed praise and

confidence about the new order of things.
The new Parliament comprised 288 deputies, of which 147 were Turks

and 60 were Arabs. 21

However, from the start Abdul Hamid had been

plotting to dissolve the Parliament and revoke the Constitution.

He

was supported by former government officials dismissed by the Committee
of Union and Progress, and also conservative Muslims, some of whom

called the Committee an association of atheists,

Jev;s

and Freemasons.

22

In April 1909, Abdul Hamid made an unsuccessful attempt at a counter-

revolution.

The Parliament and the Senate deposed him in favor of his

brother, who became Sultan Muhammad V.

23

The Young Turk Revolution was in a sense a nationalist movement of

l^Henry H. Jessup, Fifty-Three Years in Syria (New York, 1910), vol.
2,

786.

20 Zeinej The Emergence , 79.

^^Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress
in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (London, 1969), 28.

^^Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople (London, 1916), 257-58.
^^For an sccount of the counter-revolution of 1909 and of the
deposition of Abdul Hamid, see Pears, Forty Years in Cons tantinople, chs.
18 and 19.
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Muslim Turks, whose aim was to overthrow the incompetent
regime of Abdul
Hamid, and to replace it by a reform government which would
better cope

with foreign and domestic troubles.

Arabs, as well as the other subject

nationalities, played a very small role in the 1908 Revolution.

The

ascendancy of the nationalist wing of the Young Turks over the "liberal,"

pro-decentralization faction dictated that the fate of the minorities

would be Ottomanization, rather than regional autonomy.

Furthermore,

the nationalists, whose instrument was the Committee of Union and Progres

supported centralism and Turkish predominance, and did so all the more

vigorously in reaction to Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1908, and to Bulgaria's declaration of independence in 1908.

24

Lewis, Modern Turkey , 212-14; Ramsaur, The Young Turks

,
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Young Turk promises of constitutional govornrnent

,

of more

liberal institutions, and of equal rights for the subject n;jtional ities

could not check the separatist tendencies within the Empire.

The Balkan

nationalities were not amenable to Ottoman reform, no matter how
judicious, for they sought complete separation from Ottoman rule.

On

the other hand, the Arabs desired sincere and equitable reform within

the Ottoman system.

Yet they gradually became disaffected with the

Young Turks after the latter

fall<':d

to make good the promises of the

1908 Revolution and, more significantly, after they adopted

a

policy

of central ization.

The primary aim of the Young Turks
of the Ottoman Empire.

v;as

to preserve the integrity

This had been their principal reason in over-

throwing the incompetent regime of Abdul Haraid, and it became their

most important concern as Ottoman irulers.

They were basically conservative

in outlook with little inclination to bring about social change.^

Once in pov/cr the Young Turks v/ere divided into the same to

opposing camps that had characterized their prc-Rcvolution dissension.
Those supporting

a

greater measure of local autonomy and following

Prince Sabaheddin's program of decentralization were opposed by the

H-'croz Ahmad,

In Turkish Politics

Coinmittee of Union and Progress
(London, 1969), 15.

Thc_Yojun^; Turks:
,

1908-1914

'ihc

-58-

:
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nationalist wing (mostly military) which advocated greater centralization
and Turkish domination.

The failure of the 1909 counter-revolution

made the nationalists, whose instrument was the Committee of Union and
Progress, the real rulers of Turkey and, at the same time, it helped to

discredit the pro-decentralization faction because of its support of
the counter-revolution.

The power of the Committee of Union and.

Progress and the case for centralization V7ere strengthened in reaction
to both internal and external events, which are summarized by George

Antonius
The separatist forces at work in the Balkan provinces
were in the ascendant, the covetousness of two
European Powers lurked menacingly behind a thin
diplomatic veil, and a series of disasters occurred
before the Young Turks had had time to prove their
worth: the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in October 1908, the simultaneous
secession of Bulgaria, Italy's aggression on Libya
in the autumn of 1911 and the Balkan War of 1912.
In those few years, the Ottoman Empire lost all of
its provinces in Europe (except for eastern Thrace);
that part of Libya which comprised the provinces of
Tripoli and Benghazi; Crete and the islands of the
Dodecanese. In addition to the territorial losses,
a burden of military expenditure had to be incurred
which made serious inroads on Turkey's budgetary
resources

These humiliating setbacks consolidated the trend toward centralization,
and moreover they made the idea of Turkif ication "practical politics."

Turkif ication was a movement to rely primarily on the loyalty of the

Turkish element within the Ottoman Empire and to convert the Empire into
a Turkish state.

This idea, promoted by a group of Turkish intellectuals

since 1909, was adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress as state

213-217.
^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1968),

^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York, 1946), 105.

.
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policy during and after the Balkan Wars.^

The evolution of Ottoraanism

into Turkism is described by Albert Hourani as follows:
The starting-point of the process was the idea that
the only way to resolve the inherent dilemma of the
empire was to impose a single national sentiment
on it; but it gradually grew clearer that Ottoman
national sentiment could not play this role, for it
was too fragile and artificial, and rested ultimately
on nothing except loyalty to the ruling family.
*rhe only effective nationalism was that which was
rooted in some objective unity such as language or
race, and thus Ottoman nationalism gradually turned
into Turkish nationalism.
The rising Turkish nationalism strained Arab-Turkish relations.

Arab hopes for equal rights had been disappointed when the Committee of
Union and Progress rigged the first parliamentary election in 1908 so as
to ensure the election of a majority of its supporters, and also when it

seized control of the central government, restricting it to Turkish

elements.

Arab grievances against the Young Turks mounted when they

dismissed the Arab officials connected with the Hamidian regime, and

when th^ purged the decentralization elements that supported the 1909
counter-revolution.^
Moreover, the policy of Turkif ication severely aggravated Arab

disenchantment with Young Turk rule.

The attempt by the Young Turks to

impose the use of the Turkish language in the schools, in the courts of
law, and in the government positions of the Arabic-speaking regions met

with determined opposition.

To the Arabs, Arabic was a special and

^Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, The Rise of
the Turks and the Pan-Turanian Movement (London, 1920), 80, 81, 84.
^Albert Hourani, Arabic ThouRht in
(London, 1962), 281

t he
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Slassan Sa'ab, The Arab Federalists of the Ott oman Empire
(Amsterdam, 1958), 21 9-21.
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sacred language used as the medium for God's Revelation in the Sacred

Qur'an.^
In 1913, after troubled years of domestic and foreign conflicts,
the Committee of Union and Progress had firmly seized power, marking

the decisive triumph of nationalism over constitutionalism.

From then

until the Ottoman collapse in 1918, the Empire was governed by a Turkish

military dictatorship, which suppressed parliamentary opposition and
applied Hamidian-1 ike controls against dissent.

8

Turkish nationalism helped to consolidate the development of Arab
national consciousness.

The Arabs had not constituted a national entity

since the collapse of Umayyad rule in the middle of the eighth century.

But now in reaction to Turkif ication, Arabs grew jealous of the special

place v;?iich their language and ethnicity had given them in Islam.

In

the Ottoman Parliament, Arab representatives formed a close group to

protest the threat imposed on their language and political rights.

9

We have already seen how Arab pride in their culture was stimulated

by the works of Abduh, Rida, and Kawakibi, as well as by the activities
of Arab cultural and literary fraternities.

But we must emphasize that

the programs of the abovementioned (with the exception of Kawakibi),

while stimulating Arab consciousness, were intended primarily to promote
reform within the Ottoman system.

The only program of pre-Young Turk

years that advocated the establishment of an independent, political

Arab state was the one proposed by Azoury.

We have already noted how

slight its impact was on Muslim Arabs.
Nationalism
^Ibid., 220; Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergen ce of Arab
(Beirut, 1966), 98-99.
^Lewis, Modern Turkey , 225.
^Sa'ab, Arab Federalists, 219.
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Likewise, the Arab literary and political societies that developed
in opposition to the Young Turks' programs of centralization and Turkifi-

cation were geared, for the most part, toward reform, not separatism.
However, the post-1908 Arab societies differed from the earlier literary
clubs and from the Islamic reformers in that they espoused well-defined

political objectives.

These Arab societies became the leading spokesmen

for Arab rights, calling for the preservation of the use of Arabic in
the schools, lawcourts, and public offices of the Arab provinces, for

autonomy and administrative decentralization, and, in certain cases, for
dual government with the Turks.

'^^

The Arab nationalist movement, however,

was not fully consolidated until after the Arab Revolt of 1916 and the

establishment of the Syrian National Congress at Damascus in 1919.
The Arab organizations were small bodies which predominantly

comprised Muslims of the upper classes, such as public officials. Islamic
reformers, university students, and military officers.

Because of

Ottoman governmental repression, some of these organizations had to
function underground, and hence were unable to publicize their views,
thus reducing their potential for popular support.

The first of these Arab societies

^^Zeine, The Emergence

,

^Unis Sayigh, al-Hiwar

13

12

was al-Ikha al-Arabi al-Uthmani

83.

(Beirut, 1964), 119.

^^Elie Kedouri, "Hizb," Encyclopedia of Islam (2nd ed.), Ill, 519.
on these societies, their founders, and their
objectives, see Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 102-119; Richard Hartmann,
Hartmann and
•'Arabische Politische Gesellschaf ten bis 191V' in Richard

l%or information

Helmuth Schcel (eds.), Beitrage^zu^
wissenschaf t (Leipzig, 1944), 439-67; La^jVej^^^
(Constantinople, 1916).
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(The Ottoman Arab Brotherhood), which was
founded in Constantinople in

1908 mainly by Syrian officials and notables.

This

society, as its

name implies, sought to create cooperation and
harmony between the Arab

provinces and the Ottoman Government.
it professed its loyalty to the sultan.

It supported the Constitution and

Nevertheless, it did focus a

good deal of its attention on Arab aspirations.

It not only promoted

cultural interests of the Arabs, but moreover, it advocated
the guarantee
of Arab rights, the improvement of conditions in the Arab
provinces, and

the preservation of the use of the Arabic language.

only a few months before it was dissolved as

Al-Ikha lasted for

result of the Young Turks'

a

prohibition of the formation of political associations.^^
In 1909, al-Muntada al-Adabi (The Literary Club), another Arab

association, was founded in Constantinople by
students.

gaining

a

a

group of officials and

It established branches in various towns of Syria and Iraq,

relatively large membership.

It was tolerated by the Committee

of Union and Progress because it was ostensibly a non-political society,

although many of its activities and programs had political overtones.

It

was ordered dissolved by the Ottoman authorities in March 1915.^^
Of greater importance was Hizb al»Lamarkaziyyah al-Idariyyah al-

Uthmani (the Ottoman Party of Administrative Decentralization), which

was established in Cairo in 1912 by a number of prominent Syrian and

Lebanese emigres; chief among them were Rashid Rida and Rafiq al-Azm, its
president and

a

member of

a

well-known Muslim family of Damascus.

This

^^Antonius, Th e Arab Awakenin g, 102 and 105; Hnrtmann, "Arabische
Politischc Gcsselschnf ten," 448-A9; La Verite sur la Question Syriennc
11-13
108-109; Hnrtmann, "Arabische
Politischc Gesselschaften," 450-51; La Verite, 14-22.

^\ntonius. The Arab Awakening

,

,
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party established branches in many Syrian towns and, according to
Antonius, it "had become the best organized and most authoritative
spokesman of Arab aspirations."

Its objectives, as its name implies,

called for the decentralization of authority and for self-government in
the Arab provinces.

"^^

These aspirations, however, were dashed as a

result of the triumph of centralized rule under the Committee of Union
and Progress.

A group with similar aims as those of Hizb al^-Lamarkaziyyah

,

and

one that acted in close contact with it was founded in Beirut in 1913.
i

It was called the Committee for Reform, and it was composed of 86

i

)l

members, who were almost evenly divided between Muslims and Christians.

^'

1

The Beirut Committee, like Hizb al-Lamarkaziyyah

,

principally demanded

administrative decentralization in the Arab provinces, equal rights and
opportunities for Arabs, recognition of Arabic as an official language
in government and in schools, and the prohibition of conscripting

soldiers to serve outside of their native provinces in peace time.^^

However, there was a unique aspect about the Beirut Committee's
program, namely, the proposal to appoint European counselors to the

various departments in the Beirut province.

This proposal was introduced

in the program by Maronite and other Christian members of the Committee.
It is particularly significant because it demonstrates that some Lebanese

Christians were more hospitable to the prospect of French protection
than they were to the idea of Ottoraanism, and moreover that they were

l^Antonius, The Arab Awakening 109; Hartmann, "Arabische Politische
Gesellschaften," 453ff; La Verite 58-67.
,

,

l^sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Antholog y (Los Angeles,
Gesellschaften," 457-59;
1962), 32-33; Hartmann, "Arabische Politische
102.
Sa'ab, Arab Feder alists, 231-32; Zeine, The Emerp.ence,
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not Arab nationalists.

This proposal was attacked by Muslim members

of the Beirut Committee, most of whom had greater
fear of foreign than

Turkish domination.

1

The Beirut Committee for Reform was ordered dissolved by the government
in April 1913.

Many shops in Beirut closed in protest, and newspapers

appeared with a copy of the order of dissolution framed in borders of

black as their sole contents.

Though severely hampered, the Beirut

Committee continued to function, and it sent representatives to the Arab
Congress held in Paris in June 1913.

Meanwhile in Iraq, Arab anti-Ottoman activity gradually was gaining
momentum.

The Turkif ication program of the Ottoman Government caused

severe discontent in Iraq, as it had in the other Arabic speaking provinces.

Arab pride was shaken as

a

result of the policy of replacing Arabic

with Osmanli in schools and in government.

The improvement and extension

of the Ottoman system of transportation and communication meant firmer

central control, depriving local Arab notables of many traditional

prerogatives.

The secularization reforms of the Young Turks upset the
20

power and influence of many religious leaders.
As it happened one of the most potent stimuli for the Arab

nationalist movement in Iraq was provided by Sayyid Talib, the son
naqib al^ashraf of Basra.

cf

the

Sayyid Talib, like Kawakibi and numerous other

ashraf elements, was moved by personal and not ideological motives to

hostility towards the Ottoman Government.

^^ Ibid

Its centralization program

.

^^Antonius, The Ar ab Awakening, 113; Zeine, The Em ergence, 103-104.
^^Philip W. Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development
(London, 1937), 228.
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imposed a threat on his family's hereditary status of privilege and
power.

Moreover, it rejected his scheme to establish himself as the

ruler of al-Hasa and of a large portion of Central Arabia.

In view

of these circumstances, it may be concluded that Sayyid Talib used the

cause of Arab nationalism largely as an instrument to express his

frustrations against the Ottoman Goveimment, and to pursue his ambition
of carving out a region of the Empire for himself.

Sayyid Talib organized a meeting of leading Arabs in February 1913
to draft a demand for autonomous government for Basra.

One month later

he attended an Arab Conference which resolved to work for the self-

govenment or the independence

of Iraq.

Members of Hizb al-Lamarkaziyyah

in Syria and Egypt, with whom Sayyid Talib already had been in contact,

were informed of the Conference's decision.

22

Constantinople's response to the demands of the nationalists of
Iraq was to tighten the espionage system and to arrest
leaders.

a

number of Arab

In reaction Sayyid Talib increased his anti-Ottoman activity

by organizing the Basra Reform Society, to which an adjunct was formed
in Baghdad led by Muzahim Amin al-Pachaji.

The membership of the Reform

Society comprised mostly Arab army officers and local notables, embittered

by the challenge imposed on their positions by Turkish personnel.

It

issued proclamations bitterly attacking the Ottoman Government, and
an
exhorting the Arabs to arise against Ottoman tyranny and to create

independent Iraq.^^

21 Ibid.

,

232.

,

233.

22
Ibi,d.

"lbid-> 235-36
24

Emergence, 108-109.
Ibid., 236; Kedourie, "Hizb," 520; Zeine, The
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On the whole, however, the Arab movement in Iraq lagged
behind
nationalist activity in Syria and Lebanon.

Iraq did not possess comparable

educational facilities and stimulus of new ideas introduced through
trading
and missionary activities, for its geographical position and poor com-

munications separated it from the West.

Its minorities did not attract

in significant measure European protection.

In social composition,

Iraq was a semi-feudal rural domain with a small educated urban elite,
such as teachers, writers, lawyers and doctors, elements which constituted
the foundation of Arab nationalism in the Western Fertile Crescent.

However, the lack of an influential literate elite in the Arab movement
of Iraq was somewhat compensated by the important role in the movement of

the Iraqi Arab army officers in the Ottoman army.

They were the largest

group in Iraq exposed to Western thought as a result of Westernized

military education, and as such they were capable of communicating on
the political level of the various Arab organization.

25

A number of secret societies 26 with clearly avowed nationalist aims,
in contrast to the public Arab organizations already discussed, were founded

by Arab nationalists in the years between the Young Turk Revolution and the

outbreak of the First World War.

The most important ones were al-Qahtaniyya

al-Jam'iyyat al-Arabiyya al-Fatat (The Young Arab Society), and al-Ahd (The
Covenant). Al -Qahtaniyya and al-Ahd were founded successively by Arab milita

officers serving in the Ottoman

^^Ireland, Iraq

,

array

and were led by Aziz al-Misri,

227-28.

^^For data on these Arab secret societies, see Antonius, The Arab
Awakening llOff; Hartmann, Arabische Politische Gesellschaf ten," 451-67;
Kedouri, "Hizb," 519-20; La Verite sur la Questions Syrienne 23-28.
,

,

^^Named after Qahtan, a legendary ancestor of the Arabs.
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an army officer of Egyptian birth who had participated
as

a

the Committee of Union and Progress in the 1908
Revolution.

member of
Whereas

al-Qahtaniyya had a large proportion of civilians, al-Ahd
was composed
almost entirely of army officers, who were predominantly
Iraqis, the

most numerous Arab element in the Ottoman army.

Both associations

advocated the same program: the division of the Ottoman Empire
into a

Turko-Arab Empire on the Austro-Hungarian model.

Al-Qahtaniyya

.

started

in Constantinople in 1909, broke up about one year later because of
the fear that it had been betrayed to the Turks.

established in Constantinople in 1913 or 1914.

Al-Ahd also was
Since it functioned in

absolute secrecy, information is lacking on the action it may have taken
to attain its objective of a dual monarchy.

However, we do know more

about its activity at the time of the outbreak of the First World War,
and we shall discuss its political aims vis-a-vis the war together with

those of al-Fatat

.

Like al-Ahd , al-Fatat played a significant part in the Arab movement
It was started in Paris in 1909 by seven Muslim students, mainly Syrian.

After several years, its center of activity was shifted to Beirut and
later to Damascus.

As George Antonius observed, al-Fatat was to the

Arab intellectual what al-Ahd was to the Arab army officer; yet neither
group knew of the existence of the other until they established contact

early in 1915.

The policital objective of al-Fatat was Arab independence

But other than that we know very little of its transactions until the

war years.

Once again, it is difficult to have knowledge of the scope

and the effectiveness of a secret association.

However, we have reports

that al-Fatat took the initiative in calling the Arab Congress which

69.

met in Paris in June 1913.^^
The Arab Congress of 1913

v;as

attended by 24 delegates who repre-

sented a number of the various Arab societies.

The delegates were

predominantly Syrian, and roughly half were Muslims and half Christians.
They formulated a general platform of Arab demands in which they re-stated
the principles of decentralization, calling for administrative autonomy

for the provinces, equal rights for Arabs, and the recognition of Arabic
as an official language in Parliament, as well as in local government

and local schools.

There was no discussion of separatism; emphasis was

placed on the need for reform within the Empire.

In fact, the Congress

reaffirmed its loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, and it cautioned vigilance
not against the Empire, but against foreign intervention.

29

The

essential aims of the Congress are summarized in the following excerpt

from the address of the delegate Iskandar Ammun:
The Arab Ummah (nation) does not want to separate
itself from the Ottoman Empire... All that it desires
is to replace the present form of government by one more
compatible with the needs of all the diverse elements
which compose that Empire, in such wise that the inhabitants of any Province ( vilayet ) will have the final
word in the internal administration of their ovm affairs...

At first it seemed that the Ottoman Government
with the demands of the Arab Congress.

V70uld come to terms

It sent a delegate to negotiate

with the Arabs in Paris, and an agreement was reached whereby a number
of important concessions were made to the Arabs.

^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening

,

The gains achieved by

11-12; Kedourie, "Hizb,'' 519.

^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening 114-15; Hourani, Arabic Thought,
ence, 104-105.
283-84; Sa'ab, Arab Federalists, 233; Zeine, l^he Emerg
,

^Voted

al-Arabi
in Zeine, The Emerg ence, 105, from al-Mu'tamar

al-Awwal, 103-104.
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the Arabs, however, were illusory.

"The concessions had been scaled

down considerably," states Antonius, "and most of what was left was
31

hedged with reservations and ambiguity."

Ottoman refusal to compromise with Arab demands, compounded with
the negative effects of Turkif ication, caused the rift between Arab

leaders and Constantinople to become hopelessly wide.

Nevertheless,

with the exception of a small number of Arab army officers and intellectuals,

Muslim Arabs generally did not aspire for independence.

For most of

them, traditional Islamic loyalties still transcended national sentiments;

they supported in all conscience the Sultan and the Empire as lineal

successors of the caliphate and as protectors of Sunni Islam.
Moreover, some of the most vociferous groups seeking independence

from the Turks did so not as Arab nationalists, but as regional
nationalists.

This was the case with the Lebanese nationalists, mostly

an
Maronite Christians, who sought to make their autonomous sanjak

enlarged independent nation backed by French support.

We already have

a Lebanese
mentioned that the Beirut Committee for Reform was more of

than an Arab nationalist association.

Also, there was a small but

who advocated
important group of Syrian nationalists, mainly Christian,
state.
the creation of a secular national Syrian

The chief exponents

Georges Samne, both located
of the "Syria idea" were Shukri Ghanim and
32

support of the Quai d'Orsay.
in Paris where their idea received the

nationalist course, did not share
Egypt, which was pursuing its own
in the incipient Arab cause.

of
Egyptians often considered the Arabs

spokesmen like Abdullah al-Nadim
Asia foreigners, and Egyptian nationalist

^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening

,

116

^^Hourani, Arabic Thought, 285-87.

.
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and Mustafa Karail sometimes attacked the Syrian intruders settled in
Egypt,
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Egyptian national aspirations emerged in reaction to British

domination, and were primarily concerned with preserving Egypt for the
Egyptians.

Whereas Arab nationalists sought independence from the

Ottoman Empire, Egyptian nationalists looked upon the Empire as their
natural ally against the British protectorate.

Egypt did not participate

in the cause of Arab nationalism until 1938/39.^^

The limited scope of Arab nationalism at the outbreak of World War
I

is brought into clearer focus once we have considered that Egypt and

Lebanon followed separate nationalist roads, as well as the fact that a
good number of Arab groups did not seek independence from the Turks,

but rather autonomy, or administrative decentralization, or dual government
as the ideal solution,

leaders was small.

furthermore, the total number of Arab nationalist

Ihe Arab cause had hardly any support from the masses,

for, as we have reiterated, they remained passively acquiescent, if not

loyal to Ottoman authority.

Professor C. Ernest Dawn has undertaken a

statistical study of the size of the Arab movement before October 1914.
The results of his investigations are as follows:

Only 126 men are known to have been public advocates
of Arab nationalism or members of Arab nationalist
societies before October 1914... Of the 126 Arab
nationalists, 51 can be identified as Syrian; one was
Egyptian, 21 Lebanese, 18 Iraqi, 22 Palentinian
and 13 unidentifiable as to place of origin or
residence.
.

^^Ibid.
1964), 81.

,

196; Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London,

^^For the activities of the Egyptian nationalists at the end of
see
the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth,
1892-1919,"
Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., ''The Egyptian Nationalist Party,
Moder n E^;^
in Peter M. Holt (ed.), Political a nd Social Change in
196-209.
(London, 1968), 308-33; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought
,
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The 126 Arabs who were members of the Arab societies or
prominent spokesmen for the Arab cause we may regard
as the leadership of Arab nationalism.
They also make
up a significant percentage of the total number of known
active partisans of Arabism before 1914. An indication
of the spread of Arabism is provided by the signatures
to the telegrams of support which were sent to the Arab
Congress in Paris in June 1913. A total of 387 names
appear on these telegrams.

A closer look at the social status of these Arab nationalists will
reveal some of the principal factors motivating their political aspirations.
The nationalist advocates were predominantly upper class Muslims,

chiefly army officers and intellectuals.

The role of the Christian

Arabs in this particular period of the Arab movement was relatively
small.
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The nationalist aims of this privileged Muslim minority

originally derived more from personal interests than from theories on
Arabism.

Their resentment of Hamidian and especially Young Turk

encroachments on their traditional power and influence took the form of
a

nationalist reaction which was converted into an effective vehicle

for pursuing their self-interested political objectives.

That the cause

of Arab nationalism among its very exponents had not yet superseded

personal ambitions at the time of the First World War is well stated in
the following passage taken from Philip W. Ireland's Iraq: A Study in
Pol itical Development

:

In spite of the correspondence and interchange of
views between the various sections of the Arab
world, in spite of the manifestos and literature
issued in the name of the Arab peoples, in spite of
the essential unity of the aims and purposes of
Arab Nationalism, the movement tended to break into
sectionalism, limited by the horizons of immediate
The rank and file of the Movement, no
locality.
less than the sectional leaders, regarded with
^^C. Ernest Dawn. "The Rise of Arabism in Svria." Middle East
Journal XVI (1962), 148-49.
,

^^Ibid.

,

153-54, 159.
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mistrust any leaders whose ascendancy seemed to
overshadow their own interests and to detract from
their own importance.
Personal rivalries, religious
differences and sectional animosities thus hampered
the progress of the Movement, stultifying its efforts
and nullifying its effectiveness.^^

Arab nationalism was a force of only moderate importance during the
First World War, and it had relatively little influence on the origin
of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire.

Al-Fatat and al-Ahd

>

the

two most important Arab nationalist societies during the war, followed
a "wait and see" course after the

the side of the Central Powers.

Ottoman Empire had entered the war on
While they sought to exploit the war-

time opportunities to achieve the independence of the Arab countries,
still they hesitated to break away from the Empire.

They feared that

their chances for independence vjould be destroyed in the event of a

German victory, which seemed probable in 1915. 38

On the other hand, they

feared that by abandoning Ottoman protection they would leave themselves

open to the possibility of Allied encroachments.

The nationalist

desire to revolt, held in check by the fear of European imperialist
designs, is summarized in the following resolution passed by al-Fatat in
late 1914:

In consequence of Turkey's entry into the War, the fate
of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire is seriously
imperilled and every effort is to be made to secure their
liberation and independence; it being also resolved that,
in the event of European designs appearing to materialise,
the society shall be bound to work on the side of Turkey
in order to resist foreign penetration of whatever kind
or fonn.

37

Ireland, Iraq , 237.

^^C. Ernest Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca al-Husayn Ibn Ali and the
Origin of the Arab Revolt," Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society, CIV, 1 (February, 1960), 23.

^^Quoted in Antonius, The Arab Awakening

,

153.
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Similarly, Aziz Ali al-Misri told the leadership of al-Ahd
not to

consider a revolt against the Ottoman Empire without first
obtaining an
effective guarantee against European ambitions on Arab territories.^^
The preponderating fear of foreign intervention on the part of
the

Arab nationalists helps to illustrate, once again, the divergence

between Muslim and Christian Arab national aspirations.

While a good

number of Arab Christians, particularly the Maronites of Lebanon, sought
French protection, the spokesmen for the greater part of the rest of
the population, namely the Muslim Arabs

v;ho

constituted the vast

majority, strictly opposed European interference.^^
The Arab nationalists, thinking to wait until the course of the

war decisively went against the Turks before breaking with them, lost
the initiative and opportunity of leading a national war of independence.

Once the nationalists had temporized, they were never able to regain
the opportunity of spearheading an anti-Ottoman mutiny.

effectively stifled

They were

both by the "witchhunt'' conducted by Jamal Pasha,

the Turkish military governor of Syria, and by the transfer from Syria

of Arab military units, which comprised most of the members of the

nationalist society al-Ahd .^-^

Jamal Pasha, besides ordering the arrest

or deportation of hundreds of suspected nationalists, had 11 prominent

Arabs hanged after a summary trial in August 1915, and

^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening
^llbid.

,

,

21

more without

155.

153 and 155.

^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 23-24; George E. Kirk, A
of the Middle East (New York, 1964), Appendix II, 313.

^^Antonius, Hie Arab Awakening
in Syria," 151.

,

S hort

History

188; Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism

/

0
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a forroal trial in May 1916.^^

His own words bear testimony to the

effectiveness of his repressive measures in suffocating a potential Arab

rising: "I am certain that to the executions in April 1916 alone do we

owe the fact that there was no rising in Syria during the two-and-a-half

years following Sherif Hussein's declaration of independence. "^^

Yet

the most effective security device probably was the transfer of Arab

troops, for the success of an anti-Ottoman mutiny depencied ultimately on
the military.

The comparative insignificance of the nationalist leaders to the

Arab Revolt of June 1916 was matched by the minimal popular support
that the Revolt attracted.

of Turkish repression.

This was due only partly to the proficiency

An at least equally important reason for the

failure of the Revolt to win massive support is that the nationalist
idea, aspiring to an independent pan-Arab state, had not as yet attached

the allegiance of a considerable body of Arabs.
The Arab Revolt, far from being the nationalist struggle that it

has been sometimes considered, actually affected just
Arab nationalists.

a small

number of

Only some 20 to 30 nationalists in Syria, according

to Professor Dawn, took part in Arab political or military activity during

the war.

Moreover, some elements in the nationalist societies continued

to advocate Arab-Turkish cooperation.^^

The most prominent case of a

^'^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 188; Ireland, Iraq 224n; D. A.
w, "Djemal Pasha," Encyclopedia of Islam (2nd ed.), II, 531.
,

^^Djemal Pasha, Memories of
1922), 219.

a

Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919 (New York,

in
^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 25; Dawn , "The Rise of Arabism
,

151.

Syria
47

Dawn

,

"The Rise of Arabism in Syria

,"

150-51.

member of an Arab organization vho continued to strive for the pre-war
objective of Arab autonomy vithin the Ottoman Empire was that of Aziz

Ali al-Misri, the founder of al-Ahd and the appointee as Chief of Staff
of the Arab army in September 1916.

In a revealing interview with Majid

Khadduri in April 1958, al-Misri stated that "he was unaware of Sharif

Husain's objectives," and that "he had intimated to Sharif Husain that

he was not in favor of full separation from the Ottoman Empire and that

he was of the opinion that the Arabs should be satisfied with an autonomous
status within the Empire."

Al-Misri eventually withdrew from the Arab

Revolt and escaped to Germany, after he had learned that Husain intended
to make a complete break with the Ottoman Empire.
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The Arab Revolt had even less effect in the other Arab countries

than it had in Syria, which, after all, was the center of the Arab

movement.

In Iraq, as in Syria, Turkish military repression caused the

arrest, deportation, or execution of nationalist leaders, as

v/ell

as the

transfer of most of the members of al-Ahd to "safe" districts in the
Empire.

Furthermore, the British, particularly after they had occupied

Baghdad, blocked news of the Revolt in order to smother nationalist

aspirations in Iraq, and to work instead at consolidating their

ov;n

position for their eventual annexation of Lower Iraq.^^

^^Majid Khaduri, "Aziz Ali al-Misri and the Arab Nationalist Movement
in Albert Hourani (ed.), St. Anthony's Papers No. 17 (New York, 1965),
152-53.
,

^^ Ibid

.,

154-55.

^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening
^^Ireland, Iraq, 240.

,

204; Ireland, Iraq, 239-40.
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The Egyptian nationalists of course did not support the Arab Revolt,
for, as we have stated above, their prime enemy was not the Ottoman

Empire, but Britain.

Therefore, they naturally backed the Ottoman Empire

and Germany in the war in their hope of ridding Egypt of the British

protectorate.

S2

Probably the most significant contribution of the Arab nationalist
groups to the June 1916 Revolt was their proposals advocating an Arab

uprising which they sent to Sharif Husain, the Amir of Mecca.

A similar

plan had been unsuccessfully advanced in 1911, when 35 Arab representatives
of the Ottoman Parliament sent a letter with Sayyid Talib to Sharif Husain,
in vjhich they declared that they would revolt under his leadership

against the Turks and recognize him as caliph.
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In January 1915, the

leaders of al-Fatat and al^^Ahd sent Fauzi al-Bakri, a member of a

prominent Syrian family, to Mecca to propose that Husain assume the leadership of an anti-Turkish mutiny of Arab troops in Syria led by officers

who were members of al-Ahd .^^

A few months later al-Fatat and al^Ahd

jointly sent Husain, through his son Faisal, a protocol in which they
stated their war-time political objectives.

The Damascus Protocol

called for an Arab revolt in alliance with Britain on the condition that
the latter would recognize the independence of the Arab countries.

52For an account of Egyptian nationalism in the first decades of
the twentieth century, see references in footnote 34 above.
^^Hartmann, "Arabische Politische Gesellschaf ten," 457; Houranl,
Arabic Thought , 284.
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening 149-50; Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca,"
uction of the
22; Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: the Destr
Ottoman Empire (London, 1965), 58-59.
,

Arab
^^The Damascus Protocol is quoted in full in Antonius, The
Awakening 157-58.
,
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However, neither the activities of the Arab nationalists nor their

projected ideal of an independent Arab state brought about the Arab
Revolt.

The catalyst for the Revolt was provided by Sharif Husain,

who, however, in leading the anti-Turkish uprising, acted not from Arab

nationalist motives, but instead out of family interests.

Husain, a

descendant of the Prophet and a hereditary ruler of the Holy Places,

bitterly opposed Turkish attempts to extend stronger control over the
Hijaz.

He

v;as

supported by the Arab bedouin who assailed the construction

of the Hijaz Railway as disastrous to the livelihood they derived from

the pilgrimage caravans.

Husain*

s

central political objective

v/as

to secure Ottoman

recognition of his house as the hereditary autonomous Amirate in the
Hijaz.

The ideal of a pan-Arab state was at best a secondary concern.

Husain assured the Ottoman Government of his loyalty on several occasions,
and he even promised to send volunteers in support of its war effort if
58
Constantinople would guarantee his political aspirations in the Hijaz.

In fact, Husain accepted 50,000 to 60,000 pounds in gold from the Ottoman
59
Government in order to equip the volunteers that he was expected to send.

But as it became clear to Husain that Constantinople would not

support his political aims, he decided to come to a definite agreement

with the British about mid-March 1916 on the basis of the ambiguous and
controversial terms of the Husain-MacMahon Correspondence, which had been

^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 14, 20, 21.
^^Ibid.

,

28.

^^Djemal Pasha, Memories
^^Ibid., 220-21.

,

201-202, 213.

79.

conducted over a period from July 1915 to January 1916.^^

Yet even as

Husain was discussing the details with the British over the eventual
Revolt, he continued to carry out negotiations with the Ottoman authoritie

As late as April 1916, just two months before the Revolt was proclaimed,

Husain submitted to the Ottoman Government the demands that would first

have to be met before he cooperated with its war cause by sending
volunteers.

These most recent demands, however, asked not just for the

Ottoman guarantee of the hereditary autonomous Amirate in the Hijaz,
but also for a general amnesty for the Arab political prisoners and for

decentralized rule in Syria and in Iraq.
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The apparent reasons for

these expanded demands were: Husain already had been assured (though in

ambiguous terms) of British support in working for the independence
of the Arab countries; and he had ambitions, which were assiduously

cultivated by the British, of emerging as the leading spokesman and

possibly the king of the Arabs.
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Ultimately, Husain's decision to lead the Revolt was arrived at

only after his proposals were completely rejected by the Ottoman

authorities.^^

The proximate cause that triggered the Revolt in the

Hijaz was the sending of
of April to Medina.

a

Turkish force of some 3500 men toward the end

Although the new Turkish force held up in Medina

^^For the texts of the Husain-MacMahon Correspondence, see Antonius,
The Arab Awakening Appendix A.
,

^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 25«26.

^^Ibid., 26; Djemal Pasha, Memories

,

215.

(Ithaca,
^^Peter Kelt, Egypt and the Fertiie_Cres£ent 1516-1922
52-57.
264; Kedourie, England and the Middle East

N.

,

Memories, 216--17.
^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 27-28; Djemal Pasha,
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was destined for the Yemen to reinforce the Turkish offensive against
the British Protectorate in Aden, Husain and his sons felt certain that
it was intended to suppress them.

In May, the Hashimites made hasty

preparations to launch the uprising, and the date for the Revolt was
pushed forward from June 16 to June 10.

6S

The historical facts inform us that the Arab Revolt was not the

culmination of the infant Arab movement.

Revolt was decided upon without

direct nationalist influence or without even the consultation of the

nationalists, but only after the possibility of reaching an agreement

with Constantinople had been removed by the latter'

s

flat refusal to

meet Husain' s demands, particularly the one seeking Ottoman guarantee
of his Amirate in the Hijaz.^^

The political realities of self-interest,

not the idea of Arab nationalism, motivated Husain's course of action.

However, the ideology that did affect Husain as

a
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Sharif and the

one with which he was sufficiently comfortable to use in order to appeal
to popular support was Islamism.

He justified the Revolt to the Muslim

people not on the basis of the right of national self-determination,

but on the basis of the accepted Islamic doctrine sanctioning the right
of rebellion against a ruler who has failed to uphold the Shari'a and
68

thus to satisfy the essential conditions of the caliphate.

In this

Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 27-28; Djemal Pasha, Memories 223.
For the story of the Arab Revolt, see Antonius, The Arab Awakening ch10; T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York, 1935).
,

,

^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 28.
^^

Ibid

.

,

34.

Revolt," in
^^C. Ernest Dawn, "Ideological Influences in the Arab
Islam: Studies
James Kritzeck and R. Bayly Winder (eds.), Thejfcrld of
244-45.
In Honor of Philip K. Hitti (New York, 1959), 242,
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sense llusain was closely related to the school of Islamic reformers,
such as Abduh, Rida and Kavakibi, who attacked the Turks on religious

and not national grounds, and who called for a rejuvenated Islamic

state and not a secular national state.

Also Husain's son Abdullah

approved of the necessity of an Arab rising against the Turks on account
of their failure to execute the Shari'a >

Abdullah, unlike his father,

was an avowed advocate of Arabism, but more in the religious than ethnic
sense.

Like Rashid Rida by whom he was influenced, Abdullah extolled

the pre-eminence of the Arabs in Islam because they were more genuine
and faithful Muslims than the Turks.

Thus he followed the line of the

Islamic reformers in subordinating Arabism to Islam.
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The four proclamations issued by Husain between June 10, 1916
and March 5, 1917 reveal that his mind was centered on "the independence
and integrity of Islam and of its fundamental institutions, the Shari 'a

and the caliphate.

It is noteworthy that in his first proclamation,

made on the day the Revolt was declared, Husain appealed to traditional
Islamic sentiments and not to nationalist interests.

The substance of

the proclamation, striking in its omission of "Arab" and its repeated

mention of "Muslim", is reported by Antonius as follows:
The proclamation denounced the anti-Muslim practices
It represented the Revolt as a
of the C.U.P. ...
religious and national duty, and as a God-given
opportunity for the attainment of independence. It
ended by calling upon all Muslims throughout the world
to follow his example, in discharge of their obligations to him, as Sharif of Mecca, and to the cause of
Islamic solidarity.

69 Ibid., 234-238, 245-248

^^Ibid., 248.

^^AntoniuG, The Arab Awakening, 207.
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The ideology animating the Arab Revolt had its source in the

doctrines enunciated in behalf of the defense of Islam by Islamic

reformers such as al-Afghani, Abduh, Rida and Kawakibi*

It was an

ideology shaped by the general Muslim cultural reaction to European

domination and by the Muslim counter-hope for
headed by a universal caliphate.

a

renewed Islamic state
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However, although the theory of Arabism and the Arab nationalists
played a small and rather insignificant part in the origin of the Arab
Revolt, nevertheless the Revolt had substantial influence on the develop-

ment of Arab nationalism.

It brought together an Arab army, officered

in part by members of al-Ahd

,

notably the Iraqis Ja'far al-Askari,

Nuri al-Sa'id, and Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi.

Al-Ahd participated in the

Allied victory and, with the help of the British, was able to occupy
Syria.

After the war the Arab military administration became

a

government
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and it adopted a program of Arab nationalism.'"'

The crystallization of Arab nationalism, however, as well as the

heated controversy over the war-time negotiations, the post-war settlements, the Zionist claims, and the division of Arab lands into British
and French spheres of influence under the mandate system, fall outside

the scope of this essay.

They mark the end of four hundred years of

Ottoman rule and the beginning of a new phase of Arab confrontation with
the Western states.

^^Dawn, "Ideological Influences," 246 and 248.
^-^Dawn,

"The Rise of Arabism in Syria," 152.

VI

CONCLUSION

For centuries Islam had moulded the social outlooks and actions
of the vast majority of Muslim Arabs.

Characteristically, the most

influential Muslim Arab reform thinkers of the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries formulated their ideas on social change in terms of
Islam.

Modernists such as al-Afghani, Abduh, Rida and Kawakibi, as

well as their numerous intellectual successors, advocated a revival of
the pristine truths of classical Islam as the solution to contemporary

social and political problems.

They warned that imitation of Western

patterns of culture must be eschewed because they were founded on
"heretical", materialist principles.

Religious solidarity was the basis

of pan-Islam, the first major nineteenth century Islamic movement of

thought aimed at the preservation of Islamic integrity against European

domination.
The modern reinterpretation of Islam by writers such as Rida and

Kawakibi gave birth to a theory of Arabism at the turn of the century.

Their zeal in justifying Islam led them to emphasize the pre-eminent
status of the Arabs, which was derived from their historical role in

creating Islam and developing it to its most exemplary state.

The

with
Arab consciousness of these writers then was closely interwoven

their Muslim consciousness.

-83-
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The bond betv/een Arabism and Islam vas not broken even after the

emergence of Arab nationalism in the years following the Young Turk

Revolution of 1908.

The idea of a secular Arab state, which was

advocated by a few Christian Arabs, received virtually no support from

Muslim Arabs.

The most extreme Muslim Arab nationalists dreamed of a

pan-Arab state based on Islamic precepts and headed by
caliphate.

a revived

Arab

This idea began to gain support from a few Arab leaders

only in reaction to Turkif ication and Turkish intransigence in dealing

with Arab demands for local rights and a greater share in government
authority.

Most of the spokesmen for the Arab cause before the outbreak

of the First World War argued that a decentralized form of government

or regional autonomy would be the best solution to the proliems of the

multi-national Ottoman Empire.

Perhaps the Arab leaders would not have

sought complete independence or would not have revolted from the Turks,
if the latter had not pursued a chauvinist course buttressed during the

war-time stress by a policy of cruel repression.

Muslim Arabs generally

were reluctant to sever their ties with the Ottoman Empire.

It had been

sanctioned by their religion since the early sixteenth century as the
cultural home of the Muslim community.

The fact that the Empire was ruled

by a Turkish dynasty did not pose a problem for Muslim Arabs, since
ethnic distinctions between Arabs and Turks were transcended by their

supranational allegiance to Islam.
The oven^?helming majority of Arabs were not nationalists and did not
take part in the Arab Revolt of June 1916.

The nationalist movement was

limited mainly to a small minority of the Arab elite.

The dominant

collapse of
faction of the Arab elite remained Ottomanists until the
the Empire at the end of the First World War.

Arab nationalists and Arab

85.

Ottomanists differed only in the means proposed to attain the same goal,
that is, the maintenance of the integrity of Islamic culture in the face
of Western incursions.

The Arab Ottomanists asserted that Islam could

best be supported by strengthening the Ottoman Empire, whereas the

Arabists argued the necessity of restoring the pre-eminence of the

Arabs as the answer to the predicament of Islam,^
The development of the opposing ideologies of Arabism and Ottomanism,

however, derived not from broad cultural interests but from the traditional rivalry between members of the Arab elite.

Those elements

of the Arab elite whose self-interests were accommodated by the Ottoman

Empire were Ottomanists; those who were without
Empire became Arabists.

''Thus

a

vested interest in the

was a traditional intra-elite conflict,"

states Professor Dawn, "defined in terms of

a

new ideology."

2

The nucleus of the incipient Arab nationalist movement originally

comprised

dissident minority of the Arab elite whose activities

a

centered, for the most part, in a few major cities of Syria.

The Arab

cause was propelled when the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 left
the Arab Ottomanists and the indifferent Arab masses with no alternative
to Arabism.^

The post-war growth of Arab nationalism was accelerated

and consolidated in reaction to European imperialism, which was disguised
in the form of the mandates system.

The Arab movement had remained

embryonic while it had sought independence from the Ottoman Empire,

because the Arab masses and

a

majority of the Arab elite had been unwilling

state.
to separate themselves from their traditional Islamic

In contrast,

East Journal,
Ernest Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria," Middle
XVI (1962), 163-64.
^C.

^

3

Ibid

.

,

163.

Ibid., 164.
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Arab nationalism realized its potent force vhen it gained extensive
support for its ideal of uniting all the Arab peoples in opposition to

their traditional enemy, the Christian West.

Arab nationalism has become the most popular political ideology
in the contemporary Arab world.

It is the principal political mani-

festation of social change in Arab society.

Yet the ultimate dream of

the Arab nationalist leaders for the creation of a pan-Arab state has

been shattered by the consolidation of regional nationalisms in the
decades following the Second World War.

Furthermore, the question still

remains unanswered whether Arab nationalism can or should be divorced

from Islam.

The particularism of the various Arab states, a product of

the bitter rivalry among the different governments, exacerbates the

problem of the compatibility of nationalism and Islam.

Many Arabs would

like to believe that their religion and civilization are intertwined.

But only pan-Arabism, which presupposes the unity of the Muslim Arab
community, can give credence to this aspiration.

Several attempts

made at Arab unification, however, have been unsuccessful.

The Arab

League failed to establish an Arab federation, and the United Arab
Republic proved to be a short-lived experiment in Arab unification.
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